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Abstract
We analyze the effect of technological change in a novel framework that integrates an
economy’s skill distribution with its occupational and industrial structure. Individuals
become managers or workers based on their managerial vs. worker skills, and workers
further sort into a continuum of tasks (occupations) ranked by skill content. Our
theory dictates that faster technological progress for middle-skill tasks not only raises
the employment shares and relative wages of lower- and higher-skill occupations among
workers (horizontal polarization), but also raises those of managers over workers as a
whole (vertical polarization). Both dimensions of polarization are faster within sectors
that depend more on middle-skill tasks and less on managers. This endogenously leads
to faster TFP growth of such sectors, whose employment and value-added shares shrink
if sectoral goods are complementary (structural change). We present several novel
facts that support our model, followed by a quantitative analysis showing that task-
specific technological progress—which was fastest for occupations embodying routine-
manual tasks but not interpersonal skills—is important for understanding changes in
the sectoral, occupational, and organizational structure of the U.S. economy since 1980.
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1 Introduction
We develop a novel framework that integrates an economy’s distribution of individual
skills with its occupational and industrial structure. It enables an analysis of how
changes in wage and employment shares across occupations and industrial sectors are
interrelated, providing a comprehensive view on the economic forces that shape the
occupational, sectoral, and organizational structure of an economy.
In our model, individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions of skill—managerial
talent and worker human capital—based on which they become a manager or a worker.
Workers then select into a continuum of tasks (or occupations) based on their human
capital.1 Managers organize the workers’ tasks, in addition to their own, to produce
sector-specific goods. Sectors differ in how intensively different tasks are used in pro-
duction. Individual skills are sector-neutral, so they only care about their occupation
and are indifferent about which sector they work in.
We characterize the equilibrium assignment of occupations and sectors theoreti-
cally, and prove a series of comparative statics in response to task-specific technolog-
ical progress that is sector- and factor-neutral. If different tasks are complementary
in production, faster technological progress among middle-skill tasks—more precisely,
those tasks chosen by middle-skill workers in equilibrium—leads to: (i) higher em-
ployment shares and wages for low- and high-skill occupations relative to middle-skill
occupations—i.e. job and wage polarization among workers—in all sectors; (ii) a higher
employment share and wage for managers relative to workers as a whole—which we dub
vertical polarization to distinguish from the horizontal polarization across workers—in
all sectors; (iii) faster horizontal and vertical polarization within sectors that depend
more on middle-skill tasks and less on managers; and (iv) faster endogenous total
factor productivity (TFP) growth of such sectors, shrinking their employment and
value-added shares if sectoral goods are complementary (i.e., structural change).
The last result merits further discussion. First, because sector-level TFP in our
model is endogenously determined by equilibrium occupational choices, task-specific
technological progress—which is sector neutral—has differential impact across sectors,
causing structural change. Second, as the employment share of sectors that rely less on
middle-skill workers and more on managers rises, the overall degree of horizontal and
vertical polarization is reinforced. Third, if all structural change is driven by sector-
neutral task-specific technological progress, those occupations with faster technological
progress may vanish asymptotically, but all sectors coexist: Once the employment
1Technically, a task is the technology used by a certain occupation. Nonetheless, we will use “task” and
“occupation” interchangeably throughout the paper.
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shares of the occupations with faster progress become negligible, structural change
ceases. This is in contrast to theories of structural change that rely on sector-specific
forces, in which the shift of production factors from one sector to another continues
until the shrinking sector vanishes.
Predictions (i) through (iv) are salient features of the U.S. economy since 1980: (i)
job and wage polarization is well-documented in the literature, e.g., Autor and Dorn
(2013), which we refer to as horizontal polarization; (ii) using the same data, we newly
document vertical polarization; and (iii) we empirically establish that manufacturing
is more reliant on middle-skill workers and less on managers than services, and also
that, while both sectors polarized, the two dimensions of polarization are indeed faster
within manufacturing than in services.2 Finally, (iv) it is well understood that the
faster growth of manufacturing TFP—which we show accelerated around 1980 in the
data—is an important driver of structural change from manufacturing to services.
Our model shows that one common cause is driving all of the above empirical facts:
faster technological progress for middle-skill tasks (which are more intensively used in
manufacturing).
The theoretical model has one managerial task and a continuum of worker tasks.
To quantify the model, we discretize the latter into 10 occupation categories. Our
analysis confirms that task-specific technological progress alone—without sector- or
factor-specific technological progress—can almost fully account for the changes in the
sectoral, occupational, and organizational structure in the U.S. economy since 1980.
The next natural question to ask is what can explain such differential productivity
improvements across tasks. Autor and Dorn (2013), Goos, Manning, and Salomons
(2014) and others have hypothesized that “routinization,” or faster technological ad-
vancement for tasks that are more routine in nature (which tend to be middle-skill
occupations in the data), led to (horizontal) polarization. They test this empirically
by constructing a routine-task intensity (RTI) index for each occupation from the Dic-
tionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) and its successor O*NET.
We follow a similar route, but use more disaggregated indices than RTI that con-
sider detailed characteristics of occupations. We find that the task-specific technologi-
cal progress we quantify from the changes in the occupational structure is much more
strongly correlated with the routine-manual index (a component of RTI) and with the
inverse of the manual-interpersonal index than with RTI. In other words, technological
2In addition, we provide evidence from establishment-level data that corroborates faster vertical polar-
ization in manufacturing: Manufacturing establishments on average shrank faster in terms of employment
and grew faster in terms of value-added than those in services, which is predicted by our model, if we assume
that the number of managers per establishment was stable over time.
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progress since 1980 is primarily embodied in those manual tasks that are repetitive in
nature and require few interpersonal skills. This strongly suggests that the relatively
easier automation of such tasks explains their faster productivity growth, which is con-
sistent with the routinization hypothesis. On the other hand, the fact that polarization
is observed even within the service sector suggests that trade may not have been the
main driver.
Related Literature The model we consider is of particular relevance for the U.S.
and other advanced economies. The 1980s marks a starting point of rising labor mar-
ket inequality, of which polarization is a salient feature. It coincided with the rise of
low-skill service jobs (Autor and Dorn, 2013) and also a clear rise in manufacturing
productivity. The latter was implicitly noted in Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi
(2014) and is further corroborated in our empirical analysis. Our main finding in this
regard is that task-specific technological progress is of first-order importance for under-
standing the observed changes not only across occupations but also in the industrial
structure of the economy.
Costinot and Vogel (2010) presents a task-based model in which workers with a
continuum of one-dimensional skill sort into a continuum of tasks. The worker side of
our model is similar to theirs (except that we include capital), but we gain new insights
by incorporating two dimensional skills (managerial talent and worker human capital)
and multiple sectors.
The only other paper we know of with a structure in which individuals with different
skills sort into occupations, which are then used as production inputs in multiple
sectors, is Stokey (2016). The within-sector side of its model can be described as
a version of Costinot and Vogel (2010), in which skills are continuous but tasks are
discrete. The latter assumption enables an analytic characterization of the effect of
task-specific technological change, which is in turn used for demonstrating the broad
range of phenomena that can be explained by such a model.
We take the same approach in our quantitative section (i.e., tasks are discretized),
and use the U.S. data to quantify how relevant our model is for the employment and
relative wage trends across occupations and sectors between 1980 and 2010. In par-
ticular, we emphasize the differential pace of polarization across sectors and explicitly
relate polarization to structural change. In addition, since we treat managers as an
occupation that is qualitatively different from workers, the model has implications for
how production is organized in different sectors. We document several important new
facts along these dimensions that validate our modeling assumptions.
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The manager-level technology in our model extends the span-of-control model of
Lucas (1978), in which managers hire workers for production. Unlike all existing
variants of the span-of-control model, our managers organize tasks instead of workers.
That is, instead of deciding how many workers to hire, they decide on the quantities
of each task to use in production, and for each task, how much skill to hire. Moreover,
we assume a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology between managerial
and worker tasks.3
Goos et al. (2014) empirically finds that relative price changes in task-specific capi-
tal have driven employment polarization in Europe. It decomposes employment polar-
ization into within- and between-industry components, but abstracts from changes in
equilibrium wages and aggregate quantities. Our analysis shows that general equilib-
rium considerations have important implications for the estimation of the elasticity of
substitution across tasks, a key parameter in such analyses. Du¨rnecker and Herrendorf
(2017) also considers occupations and industries, and show that structural change from
manufacturing to services can be represented by shifts at the occupation level in many
countries. Its conclusion is based on classifying occupations in the data as (mutually-
exclusive) manufacturing or service jobs. In contrast, we keep occupations and sectors
conceptually separate, and analyze the effect of task-specific and sector-specific tech-
nologies for employment and wage inequalities across the skill distribution.
There is a growing literature in international trade that uses assignment models
to explain inequality between occupations and/or industries (Burstein, Morales, and
Vogel, 2015; Lee, 2015). The majority of such models follow the tradition of Roy:
Workers have as many dimensions of skills as there are available industry-occupation
combinations, and select themselves into the job in which they have a comparative
advantage. To make the model tractable, a Fre´chet distribution is utilized to collapse it
into an empirically testable set of equations for each industry and/or occupation pair.
The manager-worker division in our model is also due to Roy-selection (managerial
talent vs. worker human capital), but workers sort into a continuum of tasks based on
one-dimensional skill. Having only two skill dimensions facilitates mapping them to
individual characteristics observable in the data, so we can explore occupation choices
and (as an extension) skill formation using standard labor and macroeconomic models
of human capital.
Structural change in our model occurs because sectoral productivities evolve differ-
3While Lucas’s original model is based on a generic homogeneous-of-degree-one technology, virtually all
papers that followed assume a Cobb-Douglas technology. We incorporate (i) non-unitary elasticity between
managers and workers, (ii) heterogeneity in worker productivity as well as in managerial productivity, (iii)
multiple worker tasks (or occupations), and (iv) multiple sectors.
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entially over time, as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and most other production-driven
models of structural change. What we add to this literature is a mechanism for sectoral
productivities to evolve endogenously : the changing equilibrium occupational choice
due to task-specific technological progress. Also related is Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008), in which the capital-intensive sector vanishes in the limiting balanced growth
path. In comparison, sectors in our model differ in how intensively they use different
tasks. By contrasting different types of labor, rather than capital and labor, we can
connect structural change across sectors to labor market inequality across occupations
and skills. Moreover, unlike these papers, ours implies that it is certain occupations
rather than broadly-defined sectors that may vanish in the limit.
Finally, we note that some recent papers consider the relationship between skill and
structural change. Buera and Kaboski (2012) and Buera, Kaboski, and Rogerson (2015)
feature multiple worker types as different inputs of production. Similarly, Ba´ra´ny and
Siegel (2017) argues that polarization may be explained by structural change, in a
model where skills are occupation-specific and occupations are sector-specific. In these
models, task-specific technology is ruled out, so all change must be either skill- or
sector-specific. The addition of the task dimension in our model separates skills from
the occupation in which they are used, thereby permitting technological changes specific
to a task and also an analysis of their impact on the selection of skills into occupations.
It also allows us to exploit data on occupational employment and wages within sectors
as well as across sectors.4 Equally important, the sectoral TFPs in our model are
endogenously determined by equilibrium occupational choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the most
relevant empirical facts: horizontal and vertical polarization in the overall economy,
the faster speed of polarization within manufacturing than in services, and structural
change. In Section 3, we present the model and solve for its equilibrium. In Section 4,
we perform comparative statics showing that faster technological progress for middle-
skill tasks leads to horizontal and vertical polarization, and to structural change. In
Section 5 we calibrate a discrete-occupation version of the model, and in Section 6
quantify the importance of task-specific technological progress and map it to empirical
measures of task characteristics. Section 7 concludes, outlining the broader applicabil-
ity of our novel framework.
4Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Lee, Shin, and Lee (2015) show that
residual wage inequality controlling for education groups is much larger and has risen more since 1980 than
between-group inequality.
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Fig. 1: Structural Change, 1970-2013.
Source: BEA NIPA accounts. “Manufacturing” combines manufacturing, mining and construction, and
services subsumes service and government. Sectoral output is computed via cyclical expansion from the
industry accounts as in Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013). Employment is based on full-time
equivalent number of persons in production in NIPA Table 6. Further details are in Section 5.2.
2 Facts
In this section we summarize known facts on structural change and polarization, and
present novel evidence on how the two may be related. We also provide a new way of
looking at managerial occupations by considering them as qualtitatively different from
all other occupations, and relate them to establishments.
Structural change Figure 1 shows the (real) value-added output and employment
share trends of three broadly defined sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services,
from 1970 to 2013. Following convention, e.g. Herrendorf et al. (2014), “manufac-
turing” is the aggregation of the manufacturing, mining and construction sectors and
“services” the sum of all service and government sectors. The data are from the Na-
tional Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In particular,
employment is based on National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 6 (per-
sons involved in production), counted in terms of full-time equivalent workers.5
Two facts are well documented in the literature. First, starting from even before
1970, agriculture was a negligible share of the U.S. economy. For the remainder of
this paper, we will drop the agricultural sector, and all moments will be computed
as if the aggregate economy consisted only of manufacturing and services (e.g. the
manufacturing and service shares sum up to one).
5Computing employment shares from the decennial census yields more or less the same trend.
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Fig. 2: Log Sectoral TFP, 1947–2013.
Source: BEA NIPA accounts. Sectoral output and capital are computed via cyclical expansion from the
industry accounts as in Herrendorf et al. (2013). Employment is based on full-time equivalent number of
persons in production in NIPA Table 6. Within each sector, TFP is measured as the Solow residual given a
capital income share of 0.361, and log-TFP’s are normalized to 0 in 1947.
Second, structural change—the shifting of GDP and employment from manufactur-
ing to services—exhibits a smooth trend starting from at least the 1970s, as noted in
Herrendorf et al. (2014). Moreover, either sector’s GDP share and employment share
are almost identical both in terms of levels and trends. This implies a nearly constant
input share of labor across the two sectors, which we will assume in our theoretical
model. Herrendorf et al. (2014) also notes that manufacturing’s relative TFP has grown
quicker than services post 1970s, but that such trends may not be stable over a longer
horizon.
In Figure 2, we show TFP growth in manufacturing and services from 1948 assuming
a capital income share of 0.361.6 Note that manufacturing’s TFP relative to services
was more or less constant prior to the early 1980s, after which it exhibits a widening
gap. In our quantitative model, we will relate this to faster task-specific technological
progress among middle-skill jobs, so the timing of this rise is important: According
to Autor and Dorn (2013), this is also the period in which such jobs began to show a
distinct declining trend.
Job and wage polarization Most of the rest of our empirical analysis is based
on the decennial U.S. Censuses 1980–2010, for which we closely follow Autor and
Dorn (2013). We restrict our sample to 16–65 year-old non-farm employment. Figure
6This is the longest time period allowed by the industry accounts, which we need to compute real
GDP and capital at the sector level. Herrendorf, Herrington, and Valentinyi (2015) argues that Cobb-
Douglas sectoral production functions with equal capital income shares can quantitatively capture the effect
of differentially evolving sectoral TFP’s. See Section 5.2 for details.
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Fig. 3: Job and Wage Polarization, 1980–2010.
Source: U.S. Census (5%), extends Autor and Dorn (2013), which ends in 2005. Occupations are ranked by
their 1980 mean wage for 11 one-digit groups and smoothed across 322 three-digit groups, separately. The
widths of the bars are the employment share (in percent) in 1980. The y-axis measures the 30-year changes,
of which units are in percentage points per percentile in panel (a). More details are in Appendix A.
3 plots employment and wage changes by occupation from 1980 to 2010, extending
Figure 1 in Autor and Dorn (2013) who considered changes up to 2005. Occupations
are sorted into employment share percentiles by skill along the x-axis, where skill is
proxied by the mean (log) hourly wage of each occupation in 1980. We follow the three-
digit occ1990dd occupation coding convention in Dorn (2009), which harmonizes the
occ1990 convention in Meyer and Osborne (2005). This results in 322 occupation
categories for which employment is positive in all 4 censuses. Employment is defined
as the product of weeks worked times usual weekly hours.
The data is presented in two ways. First, following Autor and Dorn (2013), each
dot in Figure 3 represents one percent of employment in 1980. The y-axis in Panel (a)
measures each skill percentile’s employment change from 1980 to 2010 in percentage
points, and in Panel (b) the change in its mean wage. The changes are smoothed
into percentiles across neighboring occupations using a locally weighted smoothing
regression. Despite the Great Recession happening between 2005 and 2010, the long-
run patterns are virtually the same as in their study: employment has shifted from the
middle toward both lower and higher skill jobs. Likewise, wages have risen the least in
the middle, and much more toward the top.
Second, we group all occupations into 11 broad categories, vaguely corresponding
to the one-digit Census Occupation Codes (COC). These groups are ordered by the
mean wage of each broadly defined group. To represent the groups in skill percentiles,
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Fig. 4: Polarization and Structural Change, 1980–2010.
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Left: Percentage point change in manufacturing employment share within
occupation. Right: Percentage point change in occupation employment by sector. Occupations are ranked
by their 1980 mean wage for 11 one-digit groups and smoothed across 322 three-digit groups, separately.
The x-axis units are 1980 employment shares (in percent). The y-axis measures the 30-year change, of which
units are in percentage points per percentile in Panel (b). Further details are in Appendix A.
the width of each group along the x-axis is set equal to its 1980 employment share.7 In
Figure 3(a), the percentage point change of a group’s employment share is represented
by the area of the bar,8 while the height of each bar in Panel (b) measures the change in
its mean wage. Except for sales and technician occupations, the patterns of polarization
emphasized by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) are intact.9
Polarization and structural change We now ask whether polarization and
structural change are interrelated. In Figure 4, we plot the same data but along two
different dimensions. In Panel (a), occupations are ordered along the x-axis in the same
way as we did in Figure 3. For each occupation, we compute the employment share
of manufacturing in 1980 and 2010, and plot the difference.10 The bars measure the
percentage point change in the share of manufacturing employment within each COC
occupation group, and the dots the smoothed percentage point change for each skill
percentile. The entire plot is negative, which is structural change. More important,
7See Appendix A for more details on wage, employment, and occupation definitions. The three-digit
occupations in each group do not necessarily correspond to those used to generate the smooth graphs by
percentile.
8By construction, the area of all bars must add up to 0. The smoothed graph should also integrate to 0
in theory, but does not due to the locally weighted regression errors.
9The exact numbers behind these graphs are summarized in Appendix A Table 5, which also form the
basis for our calibration in Section 5.
10Appendix Figure 21(a) shows the share of manufacturing employment within each occupation in 1980,
which shows manufacturing’s reliance on middle-skill jobs.
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Fig. 5: Managers vs Workers
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Left: Relative wage and employment share of managers in aggregate. Right:
Employment share of managers within manufacturing and services. See Appendix A for how we define
managers in the census and Figure 20 for a detailed breakdown of the manager group.
manufacturing shrank the most in the middle (again, except technicians).11
In Panel (b) we plot the same changes as in Figure 3(a), but separate manufacturing
(in dark) and services (in light).12 Manufacturing lost employment across all jobs
(except managers), which is structural change. Note that this is mostly pronounced
in the middle, especially among machine operators and miners. In contrast, services
gained employment in all jobs, but mostly among extreme occupation-skill percentiles,
particularly among low-skill services and professionals.
What is important is that polarization is observed within both sectors, suggesting
the importance of task-specific forces that affect both: With sector-specific forces alone,
we would expect employment shifts across occupations to be flatter in both panels.
More important, Panel (b) shows that manufacturing polarized by more than services.
Vertical polarization In our model and quantitative analysis, we treat managers
as a special occupation that organizes all other occupations. While many studies
emphasize the organization of production (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), most
focused on top CEO’s of publicly traded companies (Tervio, 2008; Gabaix and Landier,
11Technicians include software engineers and programmers, paralegals, and health technicians, which
grew rapidly during this time period along with the service sector. Indeed, many of the smooth graphs are
flatten due to occupations in this group. However, they comprise a very small fraction of the U.S. economy
throughout the sample period.
12So the area of all bars for one sector represents structural change, while adding them across both sums to
0. Similarly the integrals of the smoothed graphs should sum to 0, subject to the locally weighted regression
errors.
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2008) or certain industries (Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). We treat
managers as a broader group including CEOs, middle managers, and the self-employed,
and also connect them to a notion of establishment. Previous papers have shown top
CEO wages rising astronomically compared to the median worker’s, and Figure 5(a)
shows that even with our broader definition, the “manager wage premium” over all
other workers rose from 45 percent in 1980 to 90 percent in 2010. At the same time,
the employment share of managers has also risen from 11 to 13.5 percent, although
there is a small drop from 2000 to 2010.13 We refer to this phenomenon throughout the
paper as “vertical polarization,” to distinguish from the horizontal polarization across
workers discussed above.
More important for us, vertical polarization was faster in manufacturing: Man-
agers’ employment share rose mostly in manufacturing but barely at all in services;
Appendix Figure 22 shows that managers’ mean wages relative to workers’ also grew
much more quickly within manufacturing than in services. This again suggests task- or
occupation-specific forces, since sector-specific forces would not create such differences
across sectors.14
We now present a model which explains all these phenomena by a single force:
task-specific technological progress among middle-skill worker occupations (Sections 3
and 4). We then proceed with a quantitative assessment and empirical investigation
of where this progress stems from (Sections 5 and 6).
3 Model
There is a continuum of individuals endowed with two types of skill, (h, z) ∈ H×Z ⊂
R+ × R+. Worker human capital, h, is used to produce worker tasks. Managerial
talent, z, is a skill for organizing tasks. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
mass of individuals is 1, with associated cumulative distribution function µ(h, z).
There are two sectors i ∈ {m, s}.15 In each sector, goods are produced by teams. A
team is led by a manager who uses his managerial skill and physical capital to organize
a continuum of worker tasks j ∈ J = [0, J ], where J is finite.
13A separate analysis of the American Community Survey, not shown here, shows that managers’ em-
ployment share continued to rise up to 14.5 percent by 2005, but then dropped by more than a percentage
point, especially since the Great Recession.
14In Appendix Figure 23(a), we instead plot the manufacturing employment share among managers and
workers, which shows that structural change was much more prevalent among workers than managers. This
is further evidence against sector-specific forces.
15In our application, the two sectors indexed by m and s stand for “manufacturing” and “services,”
respectively. However, the analysis can be extended to any finite number N of sectors.
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We will refer to the managerial task as “task z,” which is vertically differentiated
(in a hierarchical sense) from tasks j ∈ J , which are horizontally differentiated among
workers. Each worker task requires both physical and worker human capital, and their
allocations are decided by the manager. Specifically, we assume that
yi(z) =
[
η
1
ω
i xz(z)
ω−1
ω + (1− ηi) 1ω xh(z)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
, (1a)
xz(z) = M(z)kiz(z)
αz1−α, xh(z) =
[∫ J
j=0
νi(j)
1
σ τi(j; z)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
, (1b)
τi(j; z) = M(j)kih(j; z)
α
[∫
hi(j;z)
b(h, j)dµ
]1−α
, (1c)
with {νi(j), ηi} ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {m, s} and j ∈ J z ≡ J ∪{z}, and
∫
j νi(j)dj = 1.
16 It
is important to note that sectors are different in terms of how intensively they use each
task in production—i.e., ν and η have subscript i. The quantity τi(j; z) is the amount
of task j output produced for a manager of skill z in sector i. This manager uses
physical capital kiz(z) for himself, and allocates capital kih(j; z) and a set of workers
hi(j; z) to task j. The function b(h, j) is the productivity of a worker with human
capital h assigned to task j.
Assumption 1 (Log-supermodularity) The function b : H × J 7→ R+ is strictly
positive and twice-differentiable, and is log-supermodular. That is, for all h′ > h and
j′ > j:
log b(h′, j′) + log b(h, j) > log b(h′, j) + log b(h, j′). (2)
Assumption 1 ensures that high-h workers sort into high-j tasks in equilibrium. Inte-
grating b(h, j) over h of the workers in the set hi(j; z) yields the total productivity of
all workers assigned to task j by a manager of skill z in sector i.
The elasticity parameter σ captures substitutability among tasks, while ω captures
the elasticity between the composite worker task xh and the managerial task xz. The
M(j)’s, j ∈ J z, are task-specific TFP’s, which are sector-neutral.
Let Zi denote the set of individuals working as managers in sector i. Aggregating
over the output from all managers in sector i yields sectoral output
Yi = Ai
∫
Zi
yi(z)dµ, i ∈ {m, s}, (3)
where Ai is an exogenous, sector-level productivity parameter. Final goods are pro-
duced by combining output from both sectors according to a CES aggregator:
Y =
[
γ
1

mY
−1

m + γ
1

s Y
−1

s
] 
−1
, (4)
16A useful mnemonic is index i for industry (sector) and j for job (task).
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Fig. 6: Model
Individuals sort into managers and workers according to their skill (z, h), and workers further sort into
tasks. While the model has a continuum of skills and tasks, in the figure we depict the latter as three
discrete groups. Tasks are complementary with each other according to σ, and worker task composites are
complementary with managers’ according to ω. Each team is led by a manager, and the collection of team
output is sectoral output. The sectoral outputs form final output according to an elasticity parameter .
The shaded areas show that sectors differ in how intensively they use each task in production.
where γm + γs = 1. We will assume  < 1.
17
The setup of our model is schematically visualized in Figure 6.18
3.1 Planner’s Problem
We start by solving a static planner’s problem. In this model, the planner allocation
and the competitive equilibrium allocation coincide.19 A planner allocates aggregate
capital K and all individuals into sectors i ∈ {m, s} and tasks j ∈ J z. Formally, define
hi(j; z) as the amount of human capital the planner allocates to task j in sector i under
a manager with z. Also define lih(s, j) as the number of individuals with skill s = (h, z)
that the planner assigns to task j, and liz(s) the number of individuals with skill s the
planner assigns as managers, in sector i. Then the planner’s problem is to choose
factor allocation rules {kiz(z), kih(j; z), hi(j; z)} and assignment rules {lih(s, j), liz(s)}
17The estimated  between the manufacturing and the service sectors (broadly defined) is close to 0, as
we show in section 5.2.
18Except Costinot and Vogel (2010), most task-based models assume that either tasks or skills are a
continuum, but not both (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Stokey, 2016). The worker side of our model is similar
to theirs, but includes capital as a production factor and is extended to multiple sectors. In contrast to
all existing models, we add two-dimensional skills and consider managers as a special occupation, which
generates additional insights both theoretically and quantitatively.
19Nancy Stokey shared with us the insight that solving for the competitive equilibrium would be more
intuitive than solving for the planner’s problem. Although the two are equivalent, the equilibrium approach
would simplify the proofs. We are working out the details, to be included in the next iteration of the paper.
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to maximize current output (4) subject to
Yi = Ai
∫
yi(z)liz(s)ds, ∀i ∈ {m, s},
K = Km +Ks ≡
∑
i∈{m,s}
∫ {[
kiz(z) +
∫
j
kih(j; z)dj
]
· liz(s)
}
ds
Hi(j) ≡
∫
b(h, j)lih(s, j)ds =
∫ [∫
hi(j;z)
b(h, j)dµ
]
· liz(s)ds ∀i and ∀j ∈ J ,
dµ(s) =
∑
i∈{m,s}
[∫
lih(s, j)dj + liz(s)
]
ds, ∀s ∈ H ×Z, (5)
where Ki is the capital allocated to sector i, and Hi(j) the total productivity of workers
allocated to task j in sector i.
For existence of a solution, we assume that
Assumption 2 There exists a strictly positive mass of jobs such that b(0, j) > 0 and
individuals such that b(h, J) > 0.
The following assumption is needed for uniqueness:
Assumption 3 The domain of skills H×Z = [0, hM ]× [0,∞), where hM <∞ is the
upper bound of h. The measure µ(h, z) is differentiable and dµ(h, z) > 0 is continuous
on H×Z.
Assumption 3 implies that we can write
µ(h˜, z˜) =
∫ h˜ ∫ z˜
dF (z|h)dG(h) =
∫ h˜ [∫ z˜
f(z|h)dz
]
g(h)dh,
where (G, g), the marginal c.d.f. and p.d.f. of h, and (F, f), the c.d.f and p.d.f. of z
conditional on h, are continuous.
The optimal factor allocation rules across managers, {kiz(z), kih(j; z), hi(j; z)}, are
straightforward: They must equalize marginal products across managers with different
z’s. Since we assume a constant returns to scale technology at the level of managers,
we can aggregate over managers in (1) to write sectoral output as
Yi = Ai
[
η
1
ω
i X
ω−1
ω
iz + (1− ηi)
1
ωX
ω−1
ω
ih
] ω
ω−1
, (6a)
Xiz = M(z)K
α
izZ
1−α
i , Xih =
[∫
j
νi(j)
1
σTi(j)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
, (6b)
where Kiz is the total amount of capital allocated to managers and Zi ≡
∫
zliz(s)ds.
Similarly, the sectoral task composite Xih combines sectoral task aggregates
Ti(j) = M(j)Kih(j)
αHi(j)
1−α, (7)
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where Kih(j) is the total amount of capital allocated to task j in sector i.
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the solution to the planner’s prob-
lem in the following order:
1. Optimal physical capital allocations across tasks within a sector.
2. Optimal worker assignment across tasks within a sector.
3. Optimal allocation of managers vs. workers within a sector.
We then solve for the within-sector solution in Section 3.2, which allows us to express
the sectoral production function (3) only in terms of the optimal assignment rules and
sectoral aggregates. Given this, we show in Section 3.3 that the two-sector equilibrium
is unique, which enables comparative statics in Section 4. In what follows, most
algebraic derivations are relegated to the appendix.
Capital allocation within sectors For any level of sectoral capital Ki, the
planner equalizes the marginal product of capital across tasks. Given the technologies
in (6)-(7), this means that all capital decisions can be expressed as a linear function of
the capital used in task 0. Specifically, capital input ratios across worker tasks must
satisfy
piih(j) ≡ Kih(j)
Kih(0)
=
[
νi(j)
νi(0)
] 1
σ
·
[
Ti(j)
Ti(0)
]σ−1
σ
, (8)
with which we can express the worker task composite Xih in (7) as
Xih = νi(0)
1
σ−1 Π
σ
σ−1
ih Ti0, where Πih ≡
∫
j
piih(j)dj. (9)
Of course, marginal products must also be equalized across the managerial task and
the rest: Using (9) we can define
piiz ≡ Kiz
Kih(0)
=
(
ηi
1− ηi
) 1
ω
·
(
Xiz
Xih
)ω−1
ω
·Πih, (10)
which does not vary with j. Equations (8) and (10) subsume the capital allocation
decisions into the labor allocation rules through piih(j) and piiz.
Sorting workers across tasks within sectors Since we assume b(h, j) is
strictly log-supermodular, Assumptions 1-3 imply that there exists a continuous as-
signment function jˆ : [0, hM ] 7→ J s.t. jˆ′(h) > 0, and jˆ(0) = 0, jˆ(hM ) = J .20 That
20For a more formal proof, refer to Lemma 1 in Costinot and Vogel (2010).
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is, there is positive sorting of workers into tasks, and workers of skill h are assigned to
job jˆ(h). Since jˆ′(h) > 0, we can also define its inverse hˆ : J 7→ [0, hM ].
It should be clear that jˆ(h) and hˆ(j) are identical across sectors, and hence not
indexed by i. Otherwise, the planner would be able to reallocate h across sectors and
increase output. So the planner’s problem of choosing lih(s, j) has two parts: One of
choosing lh(s, j), the number of individuals with skill s assigned to task j regardless of
sector, and the other of choosing qih(j), the fraction of task j workers allocated to sector
i, which satisfies
∑
i∈{m,s} qih(j) = 1. That is, we can write lih(s, j) = qih(j) · lh(s, j).
Sorting managers vs. workers within a sector Since individuals are het-
erogeneous in two dimensions, standard Roy selection implies a cutoff rule z˜(h) such
that, for every h, individuals with z above z˜(h) become managers and the rest be-
come workers. Since we know that workers sort positively into j, we can also define
zˆ(j) = z˜(hˆ(j)). Then the planner’s problem is to get this implied rule zˆ(j) for all
j ∈ J . As was the case with workers, the manager selection rule must be identical
across sectors.
Similar to Lucas (1978), zˆ(j) is chosen so that the marginal product of the threshold
manager is equalized between tasks z and task j, so
zˆ(j)
/
b(hˆ(j), j) = piih(j)Zi
/
piizHi(j), ∀j ∈ J . (11)
Without loss of generality, we normalize b(0, 0) = 1 to obtain
zˆ ≡ zˆ(0) = z˜(0) = Zi
/
piizHi(0) (12)
which is the worker counterpart of (10): the total productivity of managers in sector
i is normalized in terms of the task-0 productivity, Hi(0). In the next subsection, we
normalize all other workers’ productivities by the task-0 productivity as well.
3.2 Within-Sector Solution
First consider the rule liz(s). Since the rule z˜(h) = zˆ(jˆ(h)) does not depend on sector,
we have∫
liz(s)ds = qiz
∫
[1− F (z˜(h)|h)] dG(h), (13)
where qiz is a sectoral weight that satisfies
∑
i∈{m,s} qiz = 1. Note that any solution
that satisfies (13) such that liz(s) = 0 iff z ≤ zˆ(j) is optimal. Hence, the planner’s
choices of zˆ(j) and qiz are unique, but not the rule liz(s): The planner does not care
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how managers are allocated between sectors for any particular s ∈ S, and only about
how the total Z is divided between sectors, where
Z ≡
∫ ∫ ∞
z˜(h)
zdF (z|h)dG(h) =
∑
i∈{m,s}
qizZi.
Next consider the planner’s choice of lh(s, j). The characterization is similar to
Costinot and Vogel (2010) and summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Define
Bj(j; hˆ) ≡ exp
[∫ j
0
∂ log b(hˆ(j′), j′)
∂j′
dj′
]
. (14)
At the planner’s solution, the productivity of all workers assigned to task j can be
expressed as
H(j) = b(hˆ(j), j) · F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j)) · hˆ′(j), ∀j ∈ J , (15)
and their ratios across tasks in sector i must satisfy
qih(j)H(j) = Hi(j) = piih(j)Hi(0)Bj(j; hˆ), (16)
Proof See Appendix B.1.
The lemma expresses all other worker allocation decisions in terms of Hi(0)—just as
we could normalize all other capital allocation by Ki(0) in (8) and (10). Equation (15)
simply states that total worker productivity in task j is the product of the infinitesimal
mass of individuals assigned to task j, times their effective productivity. Equation (16)
is the counterpart of (8): the marginal products of labor are equated at every point
along J . Similarly, all manager allocations can also be normalized by zˆ.
Corollary 1 Define the counterpart of Bj in (14):
Bh(h; jˆ) ≡ exp
[∫ h
0
∂ log b(h′, jˆ(h′))
∂h′
dh′
]
. (17)
At the planner’s solution, the productivity of the cutoff rules zˆ(j) and z˜(h) can be
expressed as
zˆ(j) = zˆ · b(hˆ(j), j)/Bj(j; hˆ) = zˆ ·Bh(hˆ(j); jˆ) ⇔ z˜(h) = zˆ ·Bh(h; jˆ). (18)
Proof See Appendix B.1.
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The corollary makes all manager cutoff rules except zˆ (the threshold at h = 0) redun-
dant, since they can be expressed only in terms of zˆ in (12) and hˆ(j). In what follows,
we suppress the dependence of Bj and Bh on hˆ and jˆ unless necessary.
So far we have normalized all allocations only in terms of the task-0 capital and
worker input, Ki(0) and Hi(0). Now we show that given a sectoral allocation rule for
each task, qih(j) and qiz, the within-sector equilibrium is unique if
Assumption 4 For all h ∈ H,
1. ∂b(h, j)
/
∂h > 0 for all j ∈ J .
2. g′(h) ≤ 0 and f ′(z|h) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ Z, and
Assumption 4.1 captures the notion that higher-h workers perform better in any task;
in particular, under this assumption, z˜(h) in (18) is a strictly increasing function.
Assumption 4.2 means that there are fewer people at higher levels of skill, which is a
common assumption and also consistent with empirical evidence.
Under these assumptions, the within-sector allocation is completely independent
of sectoral capital and labor, which admits a sectoral production function in which
sectoral TFP is solely determined by the optimal allocation rules.
Proposition 1 Suppose qih(j) and qiz are given. Under Assumptions 1-4, the within-
sector solution to the planner’s problem
{
[hˆ(j)]Jj=0, zˆ
}
exists, is unique, and is inde-
pendent of sectoral aggregates Ki and Li.
Proof See Appendix B.2.
Corollary 2 At the planner’s optimum, sectoral output can be expressed as
Yi = Φi ·Kαi L1−αi , where Φi ≡M(0) · ψi ·Π
σ−ω
(σ−1)(1−ω)
ih Π
ω
ω−1−α
Ki
Πα−1Li (19)
is the sectoral TFP, endogenously determined by the optimal allocation rules. Sectoral
TFP can be decomposed into 3 parts:
1. M(0), which is common across both sectors and exogenous;
2. ψi ≡ Ai(1− ηi)
1
ω−1 ν
1
σ−1
i0 , which is also exogenous but sector-specific;
3. the part determined by (Πih,ΠKi ,ΠLi), which is sector-specific and endogenously
determined by the allocation rules hˆ(j) and zˆ, where
ΠKi ≡ Πih + piiz = Ki/Ki(0) and ΠLi ≡ Πil + (zˆ/z¯)piiz = Li/Hi(0) (20)
are the total amounts of capital and labor in sector i in units of the task-0 capital
and labor allocated to sector i, respectively, and Πil ≡
∫ [
piih(j)/Bh(hˆ(j))
]
dj.
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Proof See Appendix B.2.
Sectoral TFP’s are independent of sectoral capital and labor shares because the
rules hˆ(j) and zˆ depend only on the relative masses of individuals across tasks within
a sector, and not on the employment shares across sectors). In fact, it is the sectoral
TFP’s that determine sectoral input shares. Since sectors only differ in how intensively
they use each task, employment shares are determined so that the marginal products
of capital and labor are equalized across sectors:
κ ≡ Ks
Km
=
Ls
Lm
=
(
γs
γm
) 1

(
Ys
Ym
) −1

=
γs
γm
·
(
Φs
Φm
)−1
(21)
where κ is the capital input ratio between sector s and m. Hence relative employment
between sectors is completely determined by the relative endogenous TFP ratio between
the two sectors. Since the Φi’s are just functions of hˆ(j) and zˆ, so are κ and sectoral
employment shares Li:
Lm = 1/(1 + κ), Ls = κ/(1 + κ). (22)
Consequently, the aggregate levels of K or L have no impact whatsoever on the as-
signment rules and employment shares.
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Full Solution
A solution to the planner’s problem coincides with an equilibrium in our economy, so
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium is equivalent to a unique solution to the
planner’s problem. As a final step, the planner needs to ensure that the within-sector
allocations are consistent with the between-sector allocations. That is, the weights used
to split the distribution µ between sectors, qih(j) and qiz, must be consistent with (21).
These are equivalent to the the labor market clearing conditions for an equilibrium.
For ease of notation, let qh(j) and qz denote the service share of employment in
tasks j and z, respectively; so qmh(j) = 1− qh(j) and qmz = 1− qz. Since hˆ(j) and zˆ
must be equal across sectors, we can use the within-sector solutions from Proposition
1 to find the qh(j) and qz that ensure this. The proposition already showed that
the within-sector solution is unique, but for uniqueness of the full solution we need
additional assumptions on µ and b(h, j) that will serve as sufficient conditions:
Assumption 5 For all (h, z) ∈ H ×Z,
1. F (z|h)/ [1− F (z|h)] ≤ z/ [∫∞z z′f(z′|h)dz′], and
2. zf(z|h)/F (z|h) ≥ (1− α)(1− ω).
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Fig. 7: Equilibrium
Assumption 5 means that the conditional distribution of z is declining but not too
much, in the sense that it still has fat tails beyond any value of h.
Assumption 6 For all (h, j) ∈ H × J , 0 < ∂2 log b(h, j)/∂h∂j < ε for all ε > 0.
That the cross partial is larger than 0 is already in Assumption 1. Assumption 6 just
means that there is just enough log-supermodularity so that workers positively sort
into tasks. While this may be a strong restriction, it also means that our results will
hold for any equilibria in the vicinity of no sorting.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1-6, the solution to the planner’s problem,
[hˆ(j), qh(j)]
J
j=0 and (zˆ, qz), exists and is unique.
Proof See Appendix B.3.
For illustrative purposes, the equilibrium skill allocation with a uniform µ(z, h) is
depicted in Figure 7. Those in Z are managers, and those in H are workers, where
the subscripts s and m denote services and manufacturing. Workers sort into tasks
indexed by j according to hˆ(j). The different masses of sectoral employment across
tasks are due to the task intensity parameters νi(j) and ηi.
3.4 Equilibrium Wages and Prices
The solution hˆ(j) and zˆ give all the information needed to derive equilibrium prices
(which are unique). The price of the final good can be normalized to 1:
P = 1 =
[
γmp
1−
m + γsp
1−
s
] 1
1− , pi = [Yi/γiY ]
− 1

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and sectoral output prices pi is obtained by plugging in the sectoral production function
(19). Let R denote the rental rate of capital and wh(h) the wage of a worker with skill
h. Since capital and labor input ratios are equalized across sectors, wh(0) can be found
from either sector:
wh(0) =
1− α
α
· RKi(0)
Hi(0) · b(0, 0) =
1− α
α
· ΠLi
ΠKi
·RK,
where the second equality follows from (19)-(21), and also from our normalization of
both b(0, 0) and the population size to 1. Similarly, all workers earn their marginal
product, so we can write
wh(h) = wh(0) ·Bh(h). (23)
Assumption 4.1 implies that w(h) is strictly increasing in h.
For all h ∈ H, threshold managers with skill z = z˜(h) are indifferent between
becoming a worker or manager, so we can determine a managerial wage rate or rental
rate of z (i.e., wz) that satisfies
wz z˜(h) = wh(h) ⇒ wz = wh(0)/zˆ, (24)
and (18) and (23) guarantee that the first equality holds for all h.
4 Comparative Statics
We now explore the implications of changes in task-specific TFP or M(j).21 In partic-
ular, we are interested in the effect of routinization, which we model as an increase in
M(j) for all j ∈ J1 ≡ [j, j], where 0 < j < j < J ; that is, as an increase in the TFP
of middle-skill tasks (or, more precisely, those tasks that are chosen by workers in the
middle of the h distribution). We refer to this group of tasks as “routine jobs,” which
will be justified in Section 6. The impact of such task-specific technological progress is
illustrated in a series of comparative statics in this section, which is possible since the
skill distribution is assumed to be continuous.
4.1 Wage and Job Polarization
First, we focus on the comparative statics for hˆ(j) and zˆ within a sector i, ignoring
sectoral reallocation. Our exercise assumes that there is an increase in the exogenous
productivity, M(j), of middle-skill j-tasks.22
21A change in factor-neutral task-TFP, M(j), is different from an increase in the amount of skill working in
any given task. Since we model worker skill as human capital, the qualitative effect of a change in task-TFP
is the same as if it were only capital-augmenting—e.g., a fall in the price of task-specific capital.
22This within-sector exercise is similar to Lemma 6 in Costinot and Vogel (2010), except that we have
capital and, more important, the vertically differentiated manager.
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Proposition 2 (Routinization and Polarization) Let J 1 ≡ (j, j) ⊂ J , where
0 < j < j < J . Suppose qh(j) and qz are held constant, and that M(j) uniformly
grows to M1(j) = M(j)em˜ for all j ∈ J 1, where m˜ > 0. Then under Assumptions 1-5,
1. if σ < 1, there exists j∗ ∈ J 1 such that hˆ1(j) > hˆ(j) for all j ∈ (0, j∗) and
hˆ1(j) < hˆ(j) for all j ∈ (j∗, J), and
2. if ω < σ < 1 and Assumption 6 holds, there exists some ε > 0 s.t. z˜1(h) < z˜(h)
for all 0 < m˜ < ε and h ∈ H.
Proof See Appendix B.4.
Part 1 implies that among worker tasks, capital and labor flow out of middle-skill tasks
into the extremes (horizontal job polarization). The relative wages of the middle-skill
tasks decline (horizontal wage polarization), since from (23),
log
[
w1(h)
w1(h∗)
]
− log
[
w(h)
w(h∗)
]
=
∫ h
h∗
[
∂ log b(h, jˆ1(h))
∂h
− ∂ log b(h, jˆ(h))
∂h
]
dh
is positive for all j 6= j∗ ∈ J 1. Part 2 implies that capital and labor flow into
management from all worker tasks, and (24) means that each manager earns a higher
wage per managerial skill (vertical polarization). The within-sector comparative static
for employment shares is depicted in Figure 8, and are consistent with the data we saw
in Figures 3 and 5(a).
The mechanism for part 1 is the same as in Goos et al. (2014): when σ < 1, the
exogenous rise in productivity causes factors to flow out to other tasks since tasks are
complementary, and we get employment polarization. As in Costinot and Vogel (2010),
this also leads to wage polarization in the presence of positive sorting. What is new
in our model is that this happens even in the presence of the vertically differentiated
management task, and that with stronger complementarity between workers and man-
agers than among workers (i.e., ω < σ < 1), similar forces drive vertical polarization
in terms of both wages and employment. Another novel feature is the impact of this
task-specific technological progress on sectoral allocation, which we now explain.
4.2 Structural Change
Previous models of structural change either rely on a non-homogeneous form of demand
(rise in income shifting demand toward service products) or relative technology differ-
ences across sectors (rise in manufacturing productivity relative to services, combined
with complementarity between the two, shifting production factors toward services).
Our model is also technology driven, but structural change arises from a skill- and
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Fig. 8: Comparative Static, Within-Sector.
sector-neutral increase in task productivities that endogenously determines sectoral
TFP’s. In contrast to recent papers arguing that sectoral productivity differences can
generate broadly-measured skill premia or polarization (Buera et al., 2015; Ba´ra´ny and
Siegel, 2017), we argue that routinization explains not only job and wage polarization
but also structural change. In addition, those papers cannot address within-sector
changes.
Decomposing Polarization Define the “unnormalized” total worker productivity
VLi = (1− ηi)νi(0)M(0)σ−1ΠLi = Vil + Vi(z), where Vil =
∫
Vi(j)dj (25)
and the weights Vi(j) for each task j ∈ J z are
Vi(j) = (1− ηi)νi(j)
[
Mh(j)Bj(j)
1−α]σ−1 /Bh(hˆ(j)) (26a)
Vi(z) = ηiM
ω−1
z · V
σ−ω
σ−1
ih · zˆα+ω(1−α)
/
z¯, (26b)
Vih ≡ νi(0)M(0)σ−1Πih =
∫ {
νi(j) ·
[
M˜(j) ·Bj(j)1−α
]σ−1}
dj. (27)
These are simply the marginal products of task j unnormalized by Hi(0), so we know
that taking the ratio between any pair yields the labor input ratio between the two
tasks; (27) is the unnormalized counterpart of Πih in (9). So the definition of ΠLi in
(20) implies that the amount of labor (or worker human capital) in each task across
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both sectors can be expressed as
L(j) =
∑
i∈{m,s}
Li(j)
Li
· Li =
∑
i∈{m,s}
Vi(j)
VLi
· Li.
We consider the same exercise as in Proposition 2, that M(j) grows to M1(j) =
exp{m˜}M(j) for m˜ > 0 and all j ∈ J 1 ≡ (j, j). Let ∆X denote the log-derivative of
X w.r.t. m˜, then
∆L(j) =
∑
i∈{m,s}
Li(j)
L(j)
·
[
∆Vi(j) −∆VLi + ∆Li
]
=
∑
i∈{m,s}
Li(j)
L(j)
·
{
∆Vi(j) −
∫
J z
[
Vi(j
′)
VLi
·∆Vi(j′)
]
dj′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wij
+∆Li
}
. (28)
A change in the Vi(j)’s occurs even holding Li’s constant, shifting the term Wij . This
leads to within-sector polarization, as we saw in Proposition 2 that intermediate tasks
shrink and management expands. To compare the sectoral differences in its impact,
we compare the ∆Vil and ∆Vi(z) across the two sectors, which represent, respectively,
the change in workers and managers. Then we can sign ∆VLi , the change in sectoral
employment shares which determines structural change.
Lemma 2 Suppose ω < σ < 1 in Proposition 2, so that we get both horizontal and
vertical polarization within sectors. Then both horizontal and vertical polarization is
faster in manufacturing in the sense that ∆Vml < ∆Vsl < 0 and ∆Vm(z) > ∆Vs(z) > 0 if
Lm(j)/Lm > Ls(j)/Ls.
Proof See Appendix B.5.
When the lemma holds, both horizontal and vertical polarization is faster in manu-
facturing, as we saw in the data in Figures 4 and 5. The assumptions in the lemma
mean that the manufacturing sector is more dependent on middle-skill or routine jobs
(j ∈ J 1) relative to services, and services more on managers relative to manufactur-
ing, which is evident in the data shown in Figures 5(b) and 21(a). Of course, these
are assumptions on endogenous variables: Because we do not know the value of task
productivities M(j), hˆ(j) and zˆ, this holds in general if there exists ν¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that νm(j)− νs(j) ≥ ν¯ for all j ∈ J 1.
Note that the lemma holds regardless of the value of qh(0), which determines the
between-sector equilibrium. So Wij in (28) gives the equilibrium change in within-
sector employment shares coming only from a change in the selection rules hˆ(j) and
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zˆ. Clearly, a change in the rules will also alter the last term, ∆Li , which captures
between-sector allocation, or structural change. Lemma 3 summarizes when structural
change is in the direction of shifting capital and labor from manufacturing to services.
Lemma 3 (Structural Change) Suppose ω < σ < 1 in Proposition 2, so that rou-
tinization causes both horizontal and vertical polarization within both sectors. Further
suppose that  < 1. Then there exists (ν¯, η¯) ∈ (0, 1) such that for all νm(j)−νs(j) ≥ ν¯,
j ∈ J 1, and ηs − ηm ≥ η¯,
(∆VLs = ∆ΠLs ) > (∆VLm = ∆ΠLm ), ∆ΠKs > ∆ΠKm , and ∆Ls > 0
where the equalities follow from (25).
Proof See Appendix B.5.
The additional assumption on ηi ensures that Lemma 2 holds even as the within-sector
share of managers increase and routine jobs decrease, as the sectoral employment share
of manufacturing declines.
It is subtle but structural change in fact has two parts. As a task becomes more
productive than others, selection on skills ensures that less resources are allocated to it
when we have complementarity across tasks (Proposition 2). If one sector uses the task
that has become more productive more intensively, resources reallocate across sectors
even holding fixed the sectoral allocation rule (Lemma 2). This is the first part.
The second part is that, as the manufacturing sector becomes more productive—
endogenously because it uses the task that has become more productive more inten-
sively than services—the equilibrium price of its output falls relative to services. The
strength of this force is governed by the elasticity between manufacturing and service
outputs, and with complementarity ( < 1), more resources are allocated to services,
as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007). These two forces are formalized in Appendix B.5.
The appendix also formalizes that structural change depends differently on the pro-
ductivity of capital and labor, as is apparent from (19)-(20). In contrast to both Ngai
and Pissarides (2007) and Goos et al. (2014), capital is homogenous in our model but
labor is not, which is measured in two different types of skills. Since labor productivity
is determined by the sorting of individuals on skill, how task-specific TFP changes sec-
toral capital and labor input ratios depends not only on the task intensity of sectors,
but also on changes in the selection rules.
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Of course from (28), it is clear that structural change (change in ∆Li) also con-
tributes to polarization. To see this more precisely, rewrite (28) using (22) as
∆L(j) = ∆Vi(j) −
∑
i∈{m,s}
Li(j)
L(j)
·∆VLi +
[
Ls(j)
L(j)
· Lm − Lm(j)
L(j)
· Ls
]
∆κ (29)
⇒ L(j) (∆L(j) −∆Vi(j)) = − ∑
i∈{m,s}
Li(j)∆VLi +
[
Vs(j)
Vs
− Vm(j)
Vm
]
LmLs∆κ.
Lemma 4 Suppose Lemma 2 holds. Then structural change also contributes to polar-
ization.
Proof Under Lemma 2, the term in the square brackets in (29) is negative for j ∈ J 1,
and positive for j = z.
This is intuitive. If manufacturing is more reliant on middle-skill tasks (that is, if it is
more routine-intense), and shrinks as a result of polarization, this leads to even more
horizontal polarization in the aggregate economy. The fact that manufacturing is less
reliant on managers at the same time implies even more vertical polarization in the
aggregate economy.
Lemmas 2-4 are depicted in the first 3 subplots of Figure 9. In Panel (a), man-
ufacturing is depicted as having a higher share in intermediate tasks, and services in
managers. As we move from (a) to (b), sectoral employment shares are held fixed,
and intermediate tasks shrink in both sectors. The change in employment shares is
larger in manufacturing due to Lemma 2. This leads to structural change in (c), ac-
cording to Lemma 3. Because manufacturing uses intermediate tasks more intensively
and managerial tasks less intensively than services, shrinking its size contributes to the
horizontal and vertical polarization for the overall economy (not separately depicted).
In the model, task-specific technological progress—changes in M(j)—shifts relative
employment shares as if the weights νi(j) and ηi were changing, so the two are not sep-
arately identified in our comparative statics. However, since the model is constructed
so that the time-invariant weights capture an initial distribution of employment shares
while task-specific TFP’s drive the changes over time, the assumptions we made in the
lemmas are valid insofar as they hold throughout our observation period in the data.23
23When we calibrate the model to the 1980 data—for which we assume that M(j) = M for all j—
the calibration naturally admits that ηm < ηs and νm(j) > νs(j) for a wide range of middle-skill jobs.
Furthermore, since occupational employment ratios between sectors are never flipped for most occupations
up to 2010, the quantitative analysis is robust to the choice of normalization year.
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Fig. 9: Comparative Statics, Across Sectors.
4.3 Polarization or Structural Change?
One may wonder if it is not task-specific productivities that lead to structural change,
but advances in sector-specific productivities that lead to polarization, considering
Lemma 4 in isolation.
One important fact is that, in the context of our model, sector-specific productivity
changes do not lead to polarization within sectors. To see this, consider a change in the
manufacturing sector’s exogenous productivity, Am. As in Ngai and Pissarides (2007),
a rise in Am changes κ at a rate of 1 −  > 0; that is, manufacturing shrinks. It can
easily be seen that none of the thresholds change, and hence neither do the Φi’s (the
endogenous sectoral TFP’s). So polarization in the overall economy can only arise by
the reallocation of labor across sectors but while preserving their ratios within each
sector. To be precise, from (28),
d logL(j)
d logAm
= (1− ) · d logL(j)
d log κ
= (1− )
[
Ls(j)
L(j)
Lm − Lm(j)
L(j)
Ls
]
< 0. (30)
Note that d logL(j)/d log κ is equal to the term in square brackets in (29), and negative
for j ∈ J 1. Hence, there is no within-sector polarization. The reason is that, in our
model, tasks are aggregated up to sectoral output, not the other way around.
Even if one were to ignore within-sector polarization, our model—specifically (30)—
provides an upper bound on how much job polarization can be accounted for by struc-
tural change. For example, in the data, the manufacturing employment share fell from
33 percent to 19 percent between 1980 and 2010. If this were solely due to an exogenous
change in Am, denoting empirical values with hats:
d log κˆ
d logAm
≈ 0.14
0.67
+
0.14
0.33
≈ 0.63.
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Now denote all routine jobs as j = 1, then we can approximate
dLˆ1
d logAm
≈ 0.63 ·
[
Lˆs1Lˆm − Lˆm1Lˆs
]
= 0.63 ·
[
Lˆs1
Lˆ1
· 0.33− Lˆm1
Lˆ1
· 0.67
]
.
In Appendix Table 5, we measure the share of routine jobs in manufacturing and in
services as a share of total employment—that is, Lˆm1 and Lˆs1—to be 26 and 33 percent
in 1980, respectively. So
dLˆ1
d logAm
≈ 0.63 [0.33 · 0.33− 0.26 · 0.67] = −0.04,
which means that a change in Am alone implies a 4-percentage-point drop in routine
jobs from 1980 to 2010 in the overall economy. As shown in Table 5, the actual drop is
13 percentage points. In other words, an exogenous structural change can explain at
best 30 percent of the polarization in the overall economy—and none within sectors.
5 Calibration
In our quantitative analysis, we will find out how much of the observed changes in
employment and wage shares of occupations and sectors from 1980 to 2010 can be
explained by task-level productivity growth, and relate such productivity growth to
empirically measurable sources. Whenever possible, we fix parameters to their empir-
ical counterparts, and separately estimate the aggregate technology (4) from the time
series of sectoral price and output ratios. Then we choose most model parameters to
fit the 1980 data exactly, including a parametric skill distribution of (h, z). The rest
of the model parameters, which include the between-task elasticity parameters σ and
ω, are calibrated to empirical trends from 1980 to 2010, without any sector-specific
moments.
5.1 Parametrization
Discrete log-supermodularity In the quantitative analysis, we collapse the con-
tinuum of horizontally differentiated worker tasks into 10 groups, corresponding to the
one-digit occupation groups in the census in Section 2 and Appendix A Table 5. (There
is still only one management task.) The 10 worker occupation groups are further cate-
gorized into low/medium/high skill tasks, or manual/routine/abstract jobs, according
to the mean wages of each occupation group.
To discretize the model, we index occupations by j = 0, . . . , 9 and assume the
following log-supermodular technology:
b(h, j) =
{
h¯ = 1 for j = 0,
h− χj for j ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, 0 = χ1 < χ2 < . . . < χ9.
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Fig. 10: Calibrated Skill Distribution
We use a type IV bivariate Pareto distribution to model the distribution over worker and manager skills
(h, z). The figure depicts the marginal distributions of each skill, and also their mean below the x-axis.
The characterization of the equilibrium is exactly the same, but we now obtain closed-
form solutions. This technology implies that, for the lowest-skill task 0, the worker’s
skill does not matter and everyone performs the task with equal efficiency. All skills are
used in task 1, but for tasks j ∈ {2, . . . , 9} there is a “skill loss,” which increases with
higher-order tasks.24 With 10 discrete tasks, we only need to solve for 10 manager-
worker thresholds hˆj , as opposed to Proposition 1 in which we have to solve a differential
equation—(35) in the appendix.25
Bidimensional skill distribution For the quantitative analysis, we assume a
skill distribution that is type IV bivariate Pareto (Arnold, 2014), with the c.d.f.
µ(h, z) = 1−
[
1 + h1/γh + z1/γz
]−a
.
We normalize γz = 1, since we cannot separately identify both skills from the skill-
specific TFP’s. This distribution is consistent with an establishment size distribution
that is Pareto, and a wage distribution that is hump-shaped and has a thinner tail.
Figure 10 shows the marginal distributions of h and z.
5.2 Aggregate Production Function
The aggregate production function (4) is estimated outside of the model. For the
estimation, we only look at manufacturing (inclusive of mining and construction) and
24This can be interpreted as low-order skills not being used in high-order tasks, or high-order tasks
requiring a fixed cost of preparation to perform the task, resulting in less skills utilized. By assuming task 0
productivity to be constant, we can normalize all other tasks by task 0, as we did for the continuous model.
25Characterization of the discrete model is summarized in Appendix C.
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(1) (2) (3)
γm 0.371
∗∗
0.346
∗∗
0.258
∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
 0.003
∗∗
0.002
∗∗
0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
AIC -550.175 -551.264 -550.866
RMSE1 0.106 0.106 0.106
RMSE2 0.039 0.039 0.039
Standard errors in parentheses
†
p < 0.10,
∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 1: Aggregate Production Function
The manufacturing share parameter γm and the manufacturing-services elasticity parameter  are estimated
from the time series of output and price ratios from 1947 to 2013, from the National Industry Accounts. For
details of the estimation, we closely follow Herrendorf et al. (2013).
services (inclusive of government). We estimate the parameters γm and  from:
log
(
pmYm
PY
)
= log γm + (1− ) log pm − log
[
γmp
1−
m + γsp
1−
s
]
+ u1
log(Y ) = c+

− 1 log
[
γ
1

mY
−1

m + γ
1

s Y
−1

s
]
+ u2
where γs ≡ 1 − γm, using non-linear seemingly unrelated regression on all years of
real and nominal sectoral output observed in the BEA Industry Accounts.26 Real
production by sector is computed by a cyclical expansion procedure as in Herrendorf
et al. (2013) using production value-added to merge lower-digit industries (as opposed
to consumption value-added in their analysis).
Sectoral prices are implied from nominal versus real sectoral quantities, which may
depend on the choice of base year. For robustness, we check results using three different
base years, corresponding to columns (1)-(3) in Table 1. For each column, respectively,
1947 is the first year the required data is available, 1980 is the first year in our model,
and 2005 is chosen as a year close to the present but before the Great Recession. The
values are in a similar range as in Herrendorf et al. (2013). For the calibration, we use
the values of (γm, ) in column (1).
The capital income share α is computed as the average of 1-(labor income/total
income), and fixed at 0.361, and assumed to be equal across sectors.27 Total income is
26The constant c is included since it is not levels but relative changes that identify .
27The difference between the α’s when we let them differ between the two sectors was negligible. Herren-
dorf et al. (2015) compares this assumption against sectoral production functions that are CES in capital
and labor, and finds that both specifications capture the effect of differential productivity growth across
sectors equally well.
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Parameter Value Target
(A)
Fixed
from
data
K1980 2.895
Computed from BEA NIPA dataK2010 4.235
α 0.361
γ 0.371
Estimated in Section 5.2
 0.003
Mj ≡M 0.985 Output per worker, normalization
Am 1.112 Manufacturing employment share
As 1.000 Normalization
νij (18) Table 3
Witin-sector employment shares by occupation
(B)
Fit to
1980
ηi (2) Within-sector manager share
χj (8) Table 3
Relative wages by occupationa 10.087
γh 0.216
γz 1.000 Normalizations;
h¯ 1.000 Not separately identified from Mj
(C)
Fit to
2010
σ 0.704
Witin-sector employment shares by occupation
ω 0.341
mj Table 3
Output per worker growth and
within-sector employment shares by occupation
Table 2: Parameters
The population size is normalized, so Kt is capital per capita. All employment share and relative wage
targets are from the census, tabulated in Appendix A Table 5.
GDI net of Mixed Income and Value-Added Tax from NIPA and Industry Accounts,
and labor income is from NIPA. For the calibration we also need total capital stock
(for manufacturing and services) for each decade, which we take from the Fixed Assets
Account Table 3 and directly plug into the model.28 Since we do not model population
growth, in practice we normalize output per worker in 1980, y1980, to one, and plug in
Kt = kt/y1980 for t ∈ {1980, 1990, 2000, 2010}, where kt is capital per worker in year t.
5.3 Setting Parameters
All parameters are in Table 2, except for the skill loss parameters χj , task intensity
parameters (ηi, νij), and task-TFP growth rates mj , which are tabulated in Table 3.
Below, we explain how these parameters are recovered. Appendix C has more detail.
Calibrating the distribution For given γh, a, and {χj}9j=2, we can numerically
compute the thresholds {hˆj}9j=1 and zˆ that exactly match observed employment shares
28Real capital stock is aggregated using the same cyclical expansion procedure used for value-added.
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Ranked by mean wage χj
Emp Wgts (νij , ηi) mj (%)Manu. Serv.
Low Skill Services - 0.016 0.136 -0.731
Middle Skill 0.816 0.524
Administrative Support - 0.088 0.173 2.930
Machine Operators 0.001 0.256 0.015 9.122
Transportation 0.002 0.119 0.081 4.348
Sales 0.003 0.026 0.123 0.012
Technicians 0.005 0.034 0.040 -1.144
Mechanics & Construction 0.006 0.159 0.065 2.315
Miners & Precision Workers 0.007 0.134 0.027 6.328
High Skill 0.168 0.340
Professionals 0.009 0.070 0.195 -2.248
Management Support 0.010 0.098 0.146 -0.489
Management - 0.076 0.130 -0.017
Table 3: Calibrated Employment Weights and Growth Rates
by occupation in 1980, by integrating over the skill distribution. With these thresholds,
we can compute model-implied relative wages using the discrete version of (23), which
is (54) in Appendix C:
w1h¯1
w0
=
h¯1
hˆ1
,
wz z¯
w0
=
z¯
zˆ
, and
wj+1(h¯j+1 − χj+1)
wj(h¯j − χj)
=
h¯j+1 − χj+1
h¯j(1− χj+1/hˆj+1)
.
Here, h¯j and z¯ denote the mean skills in each task. The left-hand side is the ratio of
mean wages by occupation, which we observe in the data. The right-hand side is a
function only of the thresholds, which themselves are functions of (γh, a, χj). Hence,
we iterate over γh, a, and {χj}9j=2 so that the model-implied ratios match observed
mean wage ratios exactly, while at the same time computing the implied thresholds
{hˆj}9j=1 and zˆ that exactly fit 1980 employment shares by occupation.29
Similarly, once the skill distribution is fixed, we can compute the implied thresholds
that fit 2010 employment shares by occupation. Denote these two sets of thresholds
as x1980 and x2010, respectively. These thresholds are determined solely by the exoge-
nously assumed skill distribution and the data, independently of our model equilibria,
so they are fixed for the rest of the calibration. We then calibrate the other parameters
so that the implied thresholds x1980 and x2010 are consistent with the 1980 and 2010
equilibria, respectively.
29The calibration yields a near linear increase in the skill loss parameters χj with j.
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Calibrated within the model We have already normalized (γz, h¯) = 1 and
χ1 = 0. We also normalize As = 1, since the model only implies a relative TFP
between sectors, and Mj ≡ M for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , z} for 1980, since they are not
separately identified from (ηi, νij) in a static equilibrium. This follows from the pro-
duction technology we assume in (6)-(7). We denote the 1980 levels of the TFP’s by
(M,Ai) and their 2010 levels by multiplying them by their respective growth rates.
For example, the manager-task TFP in 2010 is M(1 + mz)
30 and similarly sector i’s
TFP in 2010 is Ai(1 + ai)
30.
This leaves us with 35 parameters to be calibrated: the elasticity parameters (σ, ω),
TFP parameters (M,Am), task intensities ηi and {νij}9j=1 for i ∈ {m, s}, and the task-
TFP growth rates {mj}9j=z,0.30 Since we can solve for the discrete version of the model
equilibrium in closed form, most parameters are chosen so that our 1980 equilibrium
exactly fits the 1980 data moments in Appendix Table 5 exactly.
Then except for capital per worker, which we plug in from the data, all other
parameters are held fixed and only Mj , the exogenous task-TFP’s, grow from 1980 to
2010 at rate mj . In particular, our benchmark scenario assumes that am = as = 0.
The 11 constant task-TFP growth rates {mj}9j=z,0 and elasticity parameters (σ, ω)
are chosen to fit the time trends of aggregate output per worker growth and employment
shares within sectors from 1980 to 2010 (13 parameter, 21 moments).31 All resulting
parameters are tabulated in Tables 2-3.
Discussion As implied by the data in Figure 21(a) and Appendix Table 5, the
manufacturing sector has higher intensity parameters among middle skill jobs and a
lower intensity in managers.32 Since the estimated elasticity between manufacturing
and services is less than one, for structural change to occur, productivity needs to rise
by relatively more in those occupations used more intensively by manufacturing, which
are the middle-skill jobs. This is evident from the last column in Table 3.
The calibrated values for ω = 0.34 < σ = 0.70 < 1 are important both for Section 4
and our quantitative results to follow. While this was a sufficient condition in Section
4, it is validated by the data. The only other paper we know of that recovers the
elasticity across tasks is Goos et al. (2014). Their point estimate for σ is around 0.9,
which is much closer to 1 than ours.33 However, theirs is an empirical framework that
30There are only 9 horizontal intensity parameters to calibrate per sector, since
∑9
j=0 νij = 1.
31We target the linear trend from 1980 to 2010 rather than their exact values. However, since most trends
are in fact linear, using the exact values barely change our results.
32Since we normalize Mj ≡M in 1980, the parameters correspond to skill-adjusted employment weights.
33Since manager is not a special occupation in that paper, it lacks a counter part to our ω.
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does not take into account general equilibrium or aggregate effects. Both in their model
and ours, the employment share change of occupation j is determined by (1 − σ)mj
(Appendix B.4). If we were to set σ = ω = 0.9, we would recover much higher values
for mj to explain the employment share changes in the data. This would result in
sectoral and aggregate TFP growth rates that are unrealistically high.
6 Quantitative Analysis
We first assess how well the model fits empirical trends in within-sector occupation
employment shares, which were targeted, and then its performance in terms of occu-
pation employment shares in aggregate (i.e., manufacturing and services combined),
which were not targeted. We also explore the model’s predictions in other untargeted
dimensions (time trends in relative wages, within-occupation wage dispersion, and
average establishment size by sector). Then, to contrast task-specific against sector-
specific technological changes, we compare the benchmark model against versions that
also allow exogenous growth in sectoral TFP’s. Finally, we relate the task-specific
TFP growth rates quantified from our model to empirical measures of occupational
characteristics.
6.1 Model Fit
Employment shares Figure 11 plots the model implied trends in employment
shares across tasks, in aggregate and by sector, against the data. When computing the
simulated paths for 1990 and 2000, we plug in the empirical values of Kt = kt/y1980
and the task-specific TFP’s implied by the calibrated growth rates, and solve for the
respective equilibrium allocations. For ease of graphical representation, the figure
groups the 10 worker occupations ranked by their 1980 mean wage into 3 broader
categories summarized in Table 3: manual, routine, and abstract.
At first glance, it may not be so surprising that we obtain a more or less exact
fit as seen in Figure 11(c)-(d), since the discrete model equilibrium can be solved in
closed form for any given year, as we explain in Appendix C. However, while we target
the starting points for all the shares (services employment share, and within-sector
employment shares by task), we calibrated 21 trends using only 13 parameters: the 2
elasticity parameters (σ, ω) and 11 task-specific (and sector-neutral) growth rates, as
shown in Panel (C) of Table 2. The quantitative model predicts that both horizontal
and vertical polarization are faster in the manufacturing sector, as we saw in the data
and as implied by our theory: The routine employment share falls by 13 percentage
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(d) Services Share By Task
Fig. 11: Data vs. Model, Employment Shares by Task.
The quantitative model has 11 one-digit occupation groups. For graphical representation only, we re-group
the 10 worker occupations into the 3 broader categories of manual, routine, and abstract as in Table 3. The
vertical axes in (a)-(c) are employment shares for each occupation group, routine on the left and the rest on
the right. The vertical axes in (d) are the fraction working in services for each occupation group.
points in manufacturing vs. 8 in services, while the manager employment share rises
by 6 percentage points in manufacturing vs. 1 in services.
Furthermore, we did not target any aggregate or sectoral employment shares, so the
fact that aggregate occupation shares and structural change by occupation (i.e., the
rise in service share for each occupation group) are almost exactly replicated, as seen
in Figure 11(c)-(d), is also a success of the quantitative model. This suggests that the
consequences of task-specific TFP growth implied by Lemmas 2-4 should be sufficient
for explaining structural change.
6.2 Implications for Moments Not Targeted
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Fig. 12: Data vs. Model, Relative Wages by Task.
The quantitative model has 11 one-digit occupation groups. For graphical representation only, we re-group
the 10 worker occupations into the 3 broader categories of manual, routine, and abstract as in Table 3. The
vertical axes are the ratios between the average wages of occupation groups, manual-to-routine on the left
and all the others on the right.
Relative wages Although we target the 1980 average wages of the 11 occupation
groups in our calibration, we do not exploit any other wage-related moments. Before
we further discuss the model’s implications for wage moments, two clarifications are
in order. First, in our model, individuals’ earnings depends only on their skills and
occupation, not on sectors. In the data, the average wage even for a narrowly-defined
occupation is somewhat higher in manufacturing than in services—for example, see
Appendix Figure 23(b).34 We do not directly address this fact, and the average wages
of broad occupation groups (e.g., workers as a whole or the manual, routine, abstract
categories) are different between the two sectors only to the extent that they differ in
how intensely they use the 10 underlying worker occupations in Table 3.35
Second, Proposition 2 leads to polarization cast in terms of wage per skill (wz and
wh). Our unit of observation is now wages, which equal (wage per skill)×(amount of
skill). Accordingly, the average wage of an occupation changes not only because of
changes in its per-skill wage, but also because of selection on skill by occupation.
Figure 12 plots the relative mean wages of occupations (in aggregate). Manual
and abstract wages are relative to routine jobs, and manager wages are relative to
all workers. While the model trends are qualitatively consistent with the data, i.e.,
horizontal and vertical wage polarization, the quantitative fit is not tight. In particular,
the rise in the relative wage of the manager and abstract occupations is more muted
34However, the sectoral difference in the average wage of an occupation is stable throughout the observa-
tion period, so we consider the indifference assumption to be valid up to a constant.
35In this version of the model with discretized worker occupations, we only consider those equilibria in
which mean skill levels within occupations are equal across sectors.
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Fig. 13: Establishment Size by Sector
Source: BDS and NIPA. Left: Average number of workers per establishment, in aggregate and by sector.
Right: Real value-added output by establishment (millions of 2010 USD), in aggregate and by sector.
than in the data, which is explained by negative selection. As shown by Proposition
2 and Figure 8, barring a change in the underlying distributions of skills, vertical
polarization dictates that new managers have less managerial skill z than existing ones.
This brings down the mean skill level of managers, countering the positive impact on
the average wage of managers coming from the rise in wage per managerial skill wz.
Likewise, horizontal polarization necessarily implies lower-h workers in the highest-
paying abstract jobs, attenuating the positive impact on their average wage from the
higher wage per skill (wj for j = 8, 9).
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Average size of establishments In our model, the production technology has
constant returns to scale, and the size distribution of establishments is not pinned down.
However, because we model managers as a special occupation qualitatively separate
from workers, the model does have implications on the average size of establishments
as long as we assume a stable relationship between managers and establishments. With
such an assumption, e.g., a constant number of managers per establishment over time,
the faster vertical polarization in manufacturing, Figure 5(b), implies that the number
of workers per establishment should fall faster in manufacturing than in services. This is
confirmed in Figure 13(a), which plots the average number of workers per establishment
in the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Furthermore, since the model generates vertical polarization by faster productivity
36Such selection does not matter for manual jobs (j = 0), because our discretized model assumes that all
workers contribute h¯ = 1 toward task-0 production regardless of their h. The increase in the manual job
wage is entirely due to the higher wage per effective skill, w0.
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Fig. 14: Within-Occupation Wage Inequality
Log wage variance within the 4 occupation groups in the data and the model. Left scale for managers and
right scale for the rest.
growth of routine jobs, which are more intensively used in manufacturing, the faster ver-
tical polarization in manufacturing is accompanied by higher productivity and output
growth among manufacturing establishments. In Figure 13(b), we divide value-added
in the NIPA by the number of establishments in the BDS, which confirms the model
prediction.
An inconsistency is that, while the employment share of managers has grown in
the data, the number of employees per establishment overall has stayed more or less
constant throughout the observation period. This suggests a need for modeling dif-
ferentiated managerial occupations and hierarchies of management, which can capture
the rise of middle managers since 1980.
Within-group wage inequality Because our quantitative model has a contin-
uum of skills and discrete occupations, it has implications for wage inequality within
occupation groups as well. As shown in Figure 14(a), log wage variances rose sub-
stantially among managers, slightly among abstract workers, dropped among routine
workers and remained more or less constant among manual workers.
These qualitative patterns are replicated in our model, but the magnitudes of the
changes are too small compared to the data. One way to address this is to increase
the variance of the underlying skill distribution over time, which we decided against
in order to isolate task specific forces: We would be unable to separate the change in
the skill distribution that is task-specific as opposed to task-neutral, without further
assumptions on how skill is accumulated.
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6.3 Polarization, Structural Change and TFP’s
The preceding subsections show that the model targeted only to within-sector employ-
ment shares delivers a good fit in terms of employment shares in the overall economy,
albeit less in terms of relative wages. Other non-targeted moments such as establish-
ment size and wage inequality within occupations are also qualitatively consistent with
the data. We now focus on sectoral employment shares and TFP’s.
To be more specific, we analyze the role of task-specific TFP’s on structural change
in relation to two counterfactuals.
(1) We restrict all task-specific TFP growth to be equal, mj = m for all j, and
instead let the exogenous sector-specific TFPs (Am, As) grow at rates am and as,
respectively. We jointly recalibrate m, am, and as to match the empirical growth
rate of the aggregate and sectoral TFP’s from 1980 to 2010. This version only
has exogenous sector-specific TFP growth but no task-specific TFP growth.37
(2) We allow both exogenous task- and sector-specific TFP growth, and recalibrate
{mj}9j=z,0, am, and as to match the change in employment shares and the empir-
ical growth rates of the aggregate and sectoral TFP’s from 1980 to 2010. Recall
that our benchmark calibration of Section 5 restricted am and as to be 0 but did
not target sectoral TFPs.
In both cases, we keep all other parameters at their benchmark values of Tables 2-3,
and only recalibrate the TFP growth rates.
We focus on sectoral TFP’s since in our model structural change results from the
differential TFP growth between sectors—expressed in closed form in (19)—whether it
is exogenous (caused by am and as) or endogenous (as in Section 4.2). The recalibrated
parameters for the counterfactual exercises are in Appendix Table 6.
TFP and output growth Figure 15 shows the paths of sectoral log TFP’s in the
data, in our benchmark calibration, and in the two counterfactuals. By construction,
all four match aggregate TFP and GDP growth over time (Appendix Figure 24).38
Instead, we focus on the evolution of sectoral TFP’s. Note that the calibrated task-
specific TFP growth rates are higher among routine jobs, on which manufacturing
is more reliant. Since the elasticity between sectors () is less than 1, we know from
37Sectoral TFP is constructed from the NIPA accounts. Real value-added and capital are computed
via cyclical expansion from the industry accounts, labor is computed from full-time equivalent persons in
production in NIPA Table 6, and TFP is the Solow residual by sector.
38Denoting aggregate TFP as Zt, since Yt = ZtK
α
t (labor is normalized to one) and we plug in the
empirical values of Kt for all calibrations, it is the same whether we match aggregate TFP or GDP.
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Fig. 15: Benchmark vs. Counterfactuals, Sectoral TFP.
Data: NIPA. Log 1980 levels are normalized to 0, so the slopes of the lines are the growth rates.
Lemma 3 that the higher endogenous TFP growth in manufacturing leads to structural
change. However, our benchmark calibration did not target sectoral TFP’s, so the
question is whether their growth can be explained by our benchmark with only task-
specific TFP growth.
In our benchmark, we overshoot the growth rate of manufacturing TFP by about
half a percentage point per annum, while undershooting the services TFP growth rate
by the same magnitude. However, when we look at the growth rates of sectoral output
(Figure 25), these gaps nearly disappear. This is because while the model assumes that
capital and labor input ratios are equal across sectors, as shown in (21), in the data
they are not. In fact, counterfactuals (1) and (2) in Appendix Figure 25 show that when
sectoral TFP growth is matched exactly, manufacturing output grows more slowly, and
services output more quickly, than in the data. This implies that the capital input ratio
between manufacturing and services grew faster than the labor input ratio, although
the differences are small. Consequently, once we include exogenous sector-specific TFP
growth and target the empirical sectoral TFP’s, both counterfactuals under-predict
manufacturing output and over-predict services output.
Structural change and polarization Since structural change from manufactur-
ing to services is solely determined by sectoral TFP ratios (Lemma 3), the fact that
endogenous sectoral TFP growth in our benchmark closely tracks the data implies
that our model will also explain structural change in terms of employment shares. As
shown in Figure 16, our benchmark overshoots the 13-percentage-point rise in the ser-
vice employment share in the data by 1 percentage point, while both counterfactuals
41
1980 1990 2000 2010
0.66
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
 
 
Data
Benchmark
Only Sectoral
Both
Fig. 16: Benchmark vs. Counterfactuals, Service Employment Share.
Vertical axis is the services share of overall employment.
(1) and (2) undershoot by 3 percentage points. Moreover, Appendix Figure 26 shows
that when we look at structural change within occupation groups, the benchmark out-
performs both counterfactuals (1) and (2), especially for managers.
The benchmark better fits employment shares than the counterfactuals, despite
overshooting manufacturing’s relative TFP growth, because it has a better fit to sec-
toral output growth. As explained above, in the counterfactuals, sectoral output growth
is too low in manufacturing and too high in services. To the extent that all structural
change in our model is due to differential growth in sectoral TFP’s, we do not intend
to emphasize too much that the benchmark explains employment shares better than
the counterfactuals that explicitly target sectoral TFP’s.
We do emphasize that exogenous changes in sectoral TFP’s cannot cause within-
sector polarization. We still investigate their effect on aggregate employment shares
by occupation (Lemma 4). In Figure 17, we see that sectoral forces alone can account
for 15-20 percent of horizontal and vertical polarization in aggregate. This is slightly
smaller than the back-of-the-envelope calculation in Section 4.3, which showed that
the effect of sector-specific TFP’s on polarization is modest because both sectors use
routine jobs.
In contrast, task-specific TFP’s (mj ’s) can account for almost all of the changes
in both occupational and sectoral employment shares. At first glance, it may seem
that the effect of task-specific TFP growth on sectoral TFP’s—which drive structural
change—should also be modest since services also benefits from the faster TFP growth
of routine tasks. However, differential task-specific TFP growth is accompanied by
a reallocation of heterogeneous individuals across occupations, which endogenously
42
1980 1990 2000 2010
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
 
 
Data
Benchmark
Only Sectoral
Both
(a) Routine Employment Share
1980 1990 2000 2010
0.11
0.115
0.12
0.125
0.13
0.135
0.14
0.145
0.15
 
 
Data
Benchmark
Only Sectoral
Both
(b) Manager Employment Share
Fig. 17: Benchmark vs. Counterfactuals, Polarization
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share vertical polarization.
reinforces the exogenous shifts.39
To summarize, task-specific TFP growth can more or less fully account for sectoral
TFP growth and hence structural change observed between 1980 and 2010. Due to
the vertical and horizontal polarization induced by task-specific TFP growth, employ-
ment shifts to the sector that relies less on routine tasks and more on management.
Conversely, sector-specific productivities can only account for 15-20 percent of polar-
ization in the overall economy; more important, we have shown both analytically and
quantitatively that they cannot cause polarization within sectors, contrary to the data.
6.4 What Explains Task-Specific Productivity Growth?
Even with skill selection, horizontally and vertically differentiated occupations, and
multiple sectors, Figure 18(a) shows that the bulk of the changes in occupational em-
ployment shares are directly accounted for by task-specific TFP’s, with a correlation
coefficient of -0.97. This is also confirmed by the regression in the top panel of Ap-
pendix Table 7. This leads us to conclude that in order to understand changes in the
employment structure, it is important to identify what these task-TFP’s represent.
How much of the variation in the task-specific TFP growth rates can be explained
by the widely-accepted routinization hypothesis—that routine jobs were more easily
automated and hence now employ fewer workers? As a first pass, in Figure 18(b)
39In Lemma 3, this is shown as the faster growth rates of the endogenous TFP components (ΠKi ,ΠLi) in
services, which implies faster TFP growth in manufacturing, given the expression for TFP (19) and assumed
values of elasticities. Details are in Appendix B.5.
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we correlate the task-TFP growth rates with the RTI index used in Autor and Dorn
(2013), which aggregates indices used in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), which in
turn were constructed by aggregating over task requirements for specific jobs in the
DOT.40 We also correlate them with the RTI index from Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
which was constructed similarly but instead using O*NET, the successor to DOT.
While the task-TFP growth rates are positively correlated with both RTI indices
across occupations, and more strongly with the latter, there is much left to be explained.
Both the correlation and R2’s are still quite low, as shown in Appendix Table 7.
What about variables related to college education? The skill-biased technological
change (SBTC) literature proxies skill by a (four-year) college degree—see Acemoglu
(2002) for a review. As is evident from Figure 19(a), neither the fraction of college
graduates within each occupation in 1980, nor the change in this fraction from 1980 to
2010, has much of a relationship with the task-specific TFP growth rates. Although
not shown here, the level in 1980 and the growth between 1980 and 2010 of within-
occupation college wage premium are not correlated with the task-specific TFP growth
either. Moreover, as shown in Appendix Table 7, the correlation between task-specific
productivity growth and college-related variables is negative across occupations; that is,
those occupations with more college graduates or those in which the college graduate
40Figure 21(b), replicated from Autor and Dorn (2013), shows where the top employment-weighted third
of occupations in terms of RTI are along the skill percentiles. Because most routine jobs are found in the
middle, it is hypothesized and then formally tested that routinization causes (horizontal) job polarization.
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share grew the fastest in fact became relatively less productive. We conclude that
college-related variables do not explain the employment shifts across occupations and
sectors between 1980 and 2010. This is in contrast to the preceding period: Katz and
Murphy (1992) finds that college variables can account for the changes in occupational
employment shares from the early 1960s to mid-1980s, which our own empirical analysis
affirms (not reported here).
What we do find, however, is that the task-specific TFP growth rates correlate
strongly with sub-indices constructed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) using O*NET,
rather than the RTI index which aggregates over them. In particular, as shown in
Figure 19(b), the correlation of the task-TFP growth rates with routine-manual and
manual-interpersonal indices of occupations, the latter of which is not in RTI, is 0.80
and -0.77 respectively. Appendix Table 7 shows that the R2 of the respective regressions
is high at 0.64 and 0.59.
We conclude that the technological progress since 1980 has predominantly enhanced
the productivity of those occupations that are heavy on routine-manual tasks but light
on interpersonal skills, shrinking their employment shares and relative wages. Since
routine physical activities are easy to automate but tasks requiring interpersonal skills
are not, this finding points to automation as the channel of task-specific technological
progress.41 In this context, our findings are consistent with the routinization hypoth-
41As discussed at the beginning of Section 4, the effect of a change in factor-neutral task-TFP is quali-
tatively similar to that of a capital-augmenting change, which for example could have been modeled as the
fall in the price of task-specific capital (Goos et al., 2014) and directly interpreted as automation.
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esis. The unexplained part of task-specific TFP growth may also come from endoge-
nous changes in the distribution of manager and worker skills, heterogeneous degrees of
capital-labor substitutability across tasks,42 and offshoring in an open economy setting,
all of which we have abstracted from.43
7 Conclusion
We presented a multi-sector task-based model in which individuals with heterogeneous
skills select into managers or workers, and workers further positively sort into differ-
entiated tasks. It is a tractable yet powerful framework for studying the occupational,
industrial and organizational structure of an economy. We fully characterize the equi-
librium and prove that task-specific technological progress for middle-skill jobs leads
to horizontal polarization, vertical polarization, and structural change. Quantitatively,
we show that task-specific technological progress fully accounts for all of the above
phenomena in the data, unaided by sector- or factor-specific technological changes.
Consistent with the model, we document empirically that polarization is prevalent
within all sectors, including services, which suggests that trade is not the main driver
of polarization. Both in the model and in the data, horizontal and vertical polariza-
tion is faster in manufacturing than in services, causing structural change. We also
show that task-specific technological changes since 1980 are fastest in occupations that
intensively use routine-manual tasks but not interpersonal skills.
Our model admits many useful extensions that have not been pursued here. For in-
stance, one could embed individual skill dynamics to separate task productivity growth
from human capital accumulation, or include differentiated managerial tasks for a more
in-depth study of the organization of production by sector. The latter will be espe-
cially useful for understanding assortative matching between managers and workers,
as well as for studying between- and within-firm inequality. A quantitative analysis
with more than two sectors would facilitate a sharper decomposition of occupation-
and industry-specific changes, as would an empirical analysis at a higher frequency
(e.g., annual rather than decadal). A multi-country extension is feasible, which will
help analyze trade, offshoring, and foreign direct investment. We are actively exploring
some of these exciting topics.
42That is, the elasticity of substitution between capital and workers’ human capital may vary across tasks.
This would be related but distinct from typical models of capital-skill complementarity in which the elasticity
varies directly by skill, e.g. low- vs. high-skill as in Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000).
43In an open economy setting, cheaper foreign labor would be qualitatively similar to higher productivity
at the task level. We note that, although not shown here, the task-TFP growth rates are only weakly
correlated with occupations’ offshorability index constructed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011).
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Appendices
A Census Employment/Wages/Occupations
Occupation Group occ1990dd
Managers self-employment+ 4– 19
Management Support 22– 37
Professionals 43–199
Technicians 203–235
Sales 243–283
Administrative Support 303–389
Low Skill Services 405–472
Mechanics and Construction 503–599
Miners and Precision 614–699
Machine Operators 703–799
Transportation Workers 803–899
Table 4: Census Occupation Groups
322 non-farm occupations according occ1990dd (Dorn, 2009), itself harmonized from occ1990 (Meyer and
Osborne, 2005), are grouped into 11 occupation groups in order of their occ1990dd code. All self-employed
workers are classified as managers. All other occupation groups correspond to their 1-digit census occupation
group except for management support, technicians and sales. Groups are presented in their (contiguous),
ascending order of their codes, excluding agricultural occupations 473–498 which are dropped. In the main
text, occupation groups are presented in ascending order of skill (mean hourly wage).
We use the 5% census samples from IPUMS USA. We drop military, unpaid family
workers, and individuals who were in correctional or mental facilities. We also drop
workers who work either in an agricultural occupation or industry.
For each individual, (annual) employment is defined as the product of weeks
worked times usual weekly hours, weighted by census sampling weights. Missing
usual weekly hours are imputed by hours worked last week when possible. Missing
observations are imputed from workers in the same year-occupation-education cell
with 322 occupations×6 hierarchical education categories: less than high school, some
high school, high school, some college, college, and more than college.
Hourly wages are computed as annual labor income divided by annual employment
at the individual level. Hence while employment shares include the self-employed,
hourly wages do not include self-employment income.44 We correct for top-coded
44While we have only considered labor income in the paper, we have conducted robustness checks by
including business income as well. Hourly business income is defined similarly as hourly wages. We also
separately corrected for top-coding (the top-codes for labor and business income differ) and bottom-coded
in a similar fashion.
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Fig. 20: Managers in the Census
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Top managers are coded 4 in occ1990dd while broad managers include code 22
which are not-elsewhere-classified managers, or manager occupations that do not exist across all 4 censuses.
incomes by multiplying them by 1.5, and hourly wages are set to not exceed this
value divided by 50 weeks × 35 hours (full-time, full-year work). Low incomes are
bottom-coded to first percentile of each year’s wage distribution.
For the line graphs in Figures 3–4, we ranked occupations by their hourly wages
defined as above, and smoothed across skill percentiles using a bandwidth of 0.75 for
employment and 0.4 for wages; these are the same values used in Autor and Dorn
(2013). For the bar graphs in Figures 3–4, 18–19 and 21, we grouped the 322 occu-
pations vaguely up to their 1-digit Census Occupation Codes, resulting with the 11
categories summarized in Table 4 and used for our quantitative analysis. In the figures
and in Tables 5–6, these groups are then ranked by the mean wage of the entire group.
In particular, in Figures 3–4, 18(a) and 21, the horizontal length of a bar is set to equal
the corresponding group’s 1980 employment share, which does not necessarily coincide
with the 3-digit occupations used to generate the smooth graphs by percentile.
Throughout the paper, we subsume all self-employed workers into the manager
group. While the size of the group varies excluding them does not affect any of
our results qualitatively because while the employment share of non-managerial self-
employed workers was more or less constant throughout the observation period, as
shown in Figure 20. There, we decompose managers into 9 subgroups. Our benchmark
definition includes all 3 self-employed groups, top managers and narrow managers, but
excludes broad managers. Top managers are coded 4 according to occ1990dd and
includes CEO’s, public administrators and legislators. Broad managers are coded 22
and are either not-elsewhere-classified or manager occupations that do not exist across
all 4 censuses.
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1
The feasibility constraint (5) and the existence of hˆ(j) and zˆ(j) imply that the number
of people with skill s assigned to task j is
lh(s, j)ds = δ(j − jˆ(h)) · I [z ≤ z˜(h)] dµ
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function and I the indicator function. Hence the allocation
rule is completely determined by the assignment functions hˆ(j) and zˆ(j), and the
productivity of all workers assigned to task j = jˆ(h) is
H(j) =
∫
b(h, jˆ(h′)) · δ(j − jˆ(h′)) · F (z˜(h′)|h′)dG(h′).
With the change of variables j′ = jˆ(h′), we can instead integrate over j′:
H(j) =
∫
b(hˆ(j′), j′) · δ(j − j′) · F (zˆ(j′)|hˆ(j′))g(hˆ(j′)) · hˆ′(j′)dj′
= b(hˆ(j), j) · F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j)) · hˆ′(j),
which is (15).
For the optimal allocation, there can be no marginal gain from switching any
worker’s assignment. So for any j′ = j + dj,
MPTi(j) · Ti(j)
Hi(j)
· b(hˆ(j), j) ≥MPTi(j
′) · Ti(j′)
Hi(j′)
· b(hˆ(j), j′),
MPTi(j
′) · Ti(j′)
Hi(j′)
· b(hˆ(j′), j′) ≥MPTi(j) · Ti(j)
Hi(j)
· b(hˆ(j′), j),
with equality if |dj| = 0. Substituting for Hi(j) = H(j)
/
qih(j) using (15), we obtain
b(hˆ(j′), j′)
b(hˆ(j), j′)
≥ piih(j
′)
piih(j)
· qih(j)F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j))hˆ
′(j)
qih(j′)F (zˆ(j′)|hˆ(j′))g(hˆ(j′))hˆ′(j′)
≥ b(hˆ(j
′), j)
b(hˆ(j), j)
,
and as |dj| → 0,[
∂ log b(hˆ(j), j)
/
∂h
]
· hˆ′(j) = d log
{
piih(j)
/[
qih(j)F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j))hˆ′(j)
]}/
dj.
Now using the total derivative of b(hˆ(j), j):
d log b(hˆ(j), j)
/
dj =
[
∂ log b(hˆ(j), j)
/
∂h
]
· hˆ′(j) + ∂ log b(hˆ(j), j)/∂j, (31)
and applying piih(0) = 1, we obtain (16):
Hi(j)
/
piih(j)Hi(0) = exp
[∫ j
0
∂ log b(hˆ(j′), j′)
∂j′
dj′
]
≡ Bj(j; hˆ). (32)
Plugging (12) and (16) into (11) yields the first equality in (18) in the corollary, and
note that (31) implies that b(h, jˆ(h)) = Bh(h; jˆ) · Bj(jˆ(h); hˆ), which yields the second
equality.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2
First, we re-express all capital input ratios only in terms of the thresholds [hˆ(j), zˆ].
Plugging (16) into (8), and applying the task production function (7) we obtain
piih(j) = vih(j)
/[
M˜(j)Bj(j; hˆ)
1−α
]1−σ
, where vih(j) ≡ νi(j)
νi(0)
(33)
and M˜(j) ≡M(j)/M(0). Similarly, plugging (9) and (12) in (10) we obtain
piiz = viz ·
(
M˜(z) · zˆ1−α
)ω−1 ·Πσ−ωσ−1ih , where viz ≡ ηiνi(0) 1−ωσ−11− ηi (34)
and M˜(z) ≡M(z)/M(0).
Now given a between-sector allocation rule [qih(j), qiz], the optimal within-sector
allocation is described by [hˆ(j)]Jj=0 that solves a fixed point defined by (15)-(16) in
Lemma 1, and zˆ that solves the fixed point defined by (12) and (34):
hˆ′(j) =
Hi(0) · vih(j)
qih(j)
/{
[M˜(j)Bj(j)
1−α]1−σBh(hˆ(j))F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j))
}
(35a)
zˆα+ω(1−α) =
qiz
Hi(0) · viz ·Π
σ−ω
1−σ
ih · M˜(z)1−ω · Z (35b)
where the boundary conditions for the ODE in (35a) are hˆ(0) = 0 and hˆ(J) = hM ,
which implies
Hi(0) ·
∫
vih(j)
{
qih(j) · [M˜(j)Bj(j)1−α]1−σBh(hˆ(j))F (zˆ(j)|hˆ(j))g(hˆ(j))
}−1
dj
= hM . (35c)
The functions [Bj(j), Bh(h), zˆ(j), z˜(h)], which represent relative wages in equilibrium,
are defined in (14), (17) and (18); in particular, the first two are functions of [hˆ(j), jˆ(h)]
only. That is, system (35) is a fixed point only in terms of the thresholds, so their
determination is independent of the total amount of physical capital and labor in
either sector. All that matters is relative masses across tasks.
Existence of a fixed point is straightforward. For an arbitrary guess of zˆ(j), As-
sumptions 1-3 imply existence of a solution to the differential equation (35a) by Picard-
Lindelo¨f’s existence theorem. Similarly, a solution to (35b) exists by Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem once we apply a minimum value for zˆ ≥ z > 0 such that the denominator
does not converge to zero.
To show that the within-sector solution is unique, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5 Suppose [qh(j), qz] are fixed and that [hˆ(j), zˆ] and [hˆ
1(j), zˆ1] are both an
equilibrium for one sector. For any connected subset J 1 ⊆ J , hˆ and hˆ1 can never
coincide more than once on J 1.
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Proof We proceed by contradiction as in Lemmas 3-6 in Costinot and Vogel (2010).
Suppose (i) hˆ(ja) = hˆ
1(ja) and hˆ(jb) = hˆ
1(jb) such that both (ja, jb) ∈ J 1. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ja < jb are two adjacent crossing points. Then, since
[hˆ, hˆ1] are Lipschitz continuous and strictly monotone in j, it must be the case that
1. (ii) hˆ1′(ja) ≥ hˆ′(ja) and hˆ1′(jb) ≤ hˆ′(jb); and (iii) hˆ1(j) > hˆ(j) for all j ∈ (ja, jb);
or
2. (ii) hˆ1′(ja) ≤ hˆ′(ja) and hˆ1′(jb) ≥ hˆ′(jb); and (iii) hˆ1(j) < hˆ(j) for all j ∈ (ja, jb).
Consider case 1. Condition (ii) implies
hˆ1′(jb)
/
hˆ1′(ja) ≤ hˆ′(jb)
/
hˆ′(ja)
so using (31)-(32) and (35a), and applying hˆ1(j) = hˆ(j) for j ∈ {ja, jb} we obtain
0 < [α+ σ(1− α)] ·
[∫ jb
ja
∂ log b(hˆ1(j′), j′)
∂j′
dj′ −
∫ jb
ja
∂ log b(hˆ(j′), j′)
∂j′
dj′
]
(36)
≤ log
[
F (zˆ1(jb)|hˆ(jb))/F (zˆ(jb)|hˆ(jb))
]
− log
[
F (zˆ1(ja)|hˆ(ja))/F (zˆ(ja)|hˆ(ja))
]
where the first inequality follows since (2), the log-supermodularity of b, implies
∂ log b(h1, j)
/
∂j > ∂ log b(h, j)
/
∂j ∀h1 > h, (37)
and applying (iii). Next, since (18) and Assumption 4.1 implies that zˆ′(j) =
z˜′(h)hˆ′(j) > 0, Assumption 4.2 implies that the strict inequality in (36) holds only if
zˆ1(jb)/zˆ(jb) > zˆ
1(ja)/zˆ(ja) ⇔ log
[
z˜1(hb)/z˜
1(ha)
]
> log [z˜(hb)/z˜(ha)]
where we have written hx ≡ hˆ(jx) for x ∈ {a, b}. Plugging in for z˜(·) using (18) we
obtain∫ hb
ha
∂ log b(h′, jˆ1(h′))
∂h′
dh′ >
∫ hb
ha
∂ log b(h′, jˆ(h′))
∂h′
dh′
and since jˆ(h) is the inverse of hˆ(j), (iii) implies that jˆ1(h) < jˆ(h) for all h ∈ (ha, hb).
But (2), the log-supermodularity of b, implies
∂ log b(h, j1)
/
∂h < ∂ log b(h, j)
/
∂h, ∀j1 < j. (38)
a contradiction. Case 2 is symmetric.
Lemma 5 implies, in particular, that any within-sector equilibria must have identical
hˆ(j), since hˆ(0) = 0 and hˆ(J) = hM in all equilibria. Moreover, the lemma also implies
that hˆ(j) is determined independently of zˆ, which is uniquely determined by hˆ(j) given
(35). Hence, the within-sector equilibrium is unique.
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Sectoral production function The corollary expresses sectoral output only in
terms of sectoral capital and labor, and the optimal assignment rules. To derive this,
first note that using (8)-(10), sectoral capital can be written as Ki = Ki(0)ΠKi , which
is the first equation in (20). Next, from (12), we know that Zi is linear in Hi(0):
Zi = qizLz z¯ = Liz z¯ = Hi(0) · zˆpiiz, where Lz ≡
∫
z>z˜(h)
dµ, z¯ = Z/Lz,
and using Lemma 1 and (33), so is total worker productivity:∫ [
Hi(j)
/
b(hˆ(j), j)
]
dj =
∫
qih(jˆ(h))F (z˜(h)|h)g(h)dh
= Hi(0) ·
∫ [
piih(j)/Bh(hˆ(j))
]
dj = Li − Liz.
So rearranging, we can represent sectoral labor input as Li = Hi(0)ΠLi , which is the
second equation in 20. Finally, use (7)-(10) to rewrite (6) as
Yi = ψi ·Π
ω
ω−1
Ki
Π
σ−ω
(σ−1)(1−ω)
ih M(0)Ki(0)
αHi(0)
1−α,
and replacing [Ki(0), Hi(0)] with the expressions in (20) yields (19).
B.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Since Proposition 1 showed that the within-sector solution (and hence equilibrium)
is unique, we only need to show that the sectoral allocation rules {[qh(j)]Jj=0, qz} are
unique. In equilibrium, the allocation rules [hˆ(j), zˆ] must be equal across sectors.
Applying this to (35a) yields
qh(j) = 1
/[
1 +
1− qh(0)
qh(0)
· νs(0)
νm(0)
· νm(j)
νs(j)
]
(39)
and qh(0) must solve (35c), so the dependence of the between-sector allocation rule
on the within-sector rule comes only through qh(0). Likewise, the rule for splitting
individuals between managers and workers, (35b), implies
qz = 1
/[
1 +
1− qh(0)
qh(0)
· νs(0)
νm(0)
· ηm(1− ηs)
(1− ηm)ηs ·
(
Vsh
Vmh
)σ−ω
1−σ
]
(40)
where Vih is defined in (27) and depends on the within-sector allocation rule through
Bj . But note that given qh(0), the other qh(j) only depend on the task intensity
parameters νi(j) and are uniquely fixed by (39). Then we know from Proposition 1
that all hˆ(j) are uniquely determined, as well as zˆ. Hence, qz also only depends on the
manager intensity parameters ηi, and are uniquely determined by (40) given qh(0).
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So in equilibrium, qh(0) alone must solve the implied sectoral shares in (21) given
(19):
qh(0)
1− qh(0) ≡ Q(qh(0)) (41)
=
γs
γm
·
(
ψs
ψm
)−1
·
(
Πsh
Πmh
) (σ−ω)(1−)
(1−σ)(1−ω)
·
(
ΠKs
ΠKm
)(α+ ω1−ω )(1−)
·
(
ΠLs
ΠLm
)−[α+(1−α)]
.
Existence of a solution is straightforward, since the LHS of (41) increases smoothly
from 0 to ∞ as qh(0) varies from 0 to 1, while the RHS is always positive and strictly
bounded regardless of the value of qh(0). To show uniqueness then, it suffices to show
that the RHS cannot cross LHS more than once. We will consider the log derivatives
of the RHS of (41) term by term.
Let ∆x denote the log-derivative of x w.r.t. qh(0). Since Assumption 6 implies that
∆Bj(j) =
∫ j
0
∂2 log b(hˆ(j′), j′)
∂h∂j′
· dˆ
′h(j′)
dj′
· dj′ < ε (42)
for all ε > 0, we obtain from (33) that
∆piih = (1− α)(σ − 1) ·∆Bj(j) ≈ 0
so ∆Πih ≈ 0. Likewise, Assumption 6 also implies that
∆Bh(h) =
∫ h
0
∂2 log b(h′, jˆ(h′))
∂h′∂j
· djˆ(h
′)
dh′
· dh′ < ε (43)
for all ε > 0. This implies that hˆ(j) is not affected by the choice of qh(0), and it is
independent of the determination of zˆ by Lemma 5. Intuitively, Assumption 6 makes
the model behave as if there were no log-supermodularity. Then since we assume a
constant returns technology, all worker allocations approach constant multiples of H0
and does not depend on its particular value. So ∆Πih ≈ 0, and ∆ΠKi only depends on
∆zˆ since from the definition of ΠKi in (20) and (34),
∆piiz = (1− α)(ω − 1)∆zˆ ⇒ ∆ΠKiΠKi = piiz · (1− α)(ω − 1)∆zˆ,
Similarly, ∆ΠLi only depends on ∆zˆ as well, since from (18) and (43) we obtain
∆z˜(h) = ∆zˆ + ∆Bh(h) ≈ ∆zˆ. (44)
so using Leibniz’ rule,
∆Z · Z = −∆zˆ ·
∫ [
z˜(h)2 · f(z˜(h)|h)] g(h)dh, (45)
∆Lz · Lz = −∆zˆ ·
∫
[z˜(h) · f(z˜(h)|h)] g(h)dh,
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⇒ ∆z¯ = ∆Z −∆Lz = ∆zˆ ·
∫
{z˜(h) [1/Lz − z˜(h)/Z] · f(z˜(h)|h)} g(h)dh︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ∈(0,1)
where the inequality follows from selection and Assumption 5.1, so using this and (43),
from the definition of ΠLi in (20) we obtain
∆ΠLiΠLi = (zˆ/z¯)piiz · [α+ ω(1− α)− Λ] ∆zˆ.
Now rearranging (35b), plugging in (45), and using (35a) at j = 0 we obtain{
α+ ω(1− α) + zˆf(zˆ|0)/F (zˆ|0) + ∫ [z˜(h)2 · f(z˜(h)|h)] g(h)dh}∆zˆ
= ∆qz − 1 ≡ Γ(X),
since Hs(0) = qh(0)H(0), ∆hˆ′(0) = 0 as it does not vary with qh(0), and Γ(X) is defined
from (40):
Γ(X) = qh(0)(X − 1)/ [qh(0) + (1− qh(0))X] ,
where X ≡ νs(0)
νm(0)
· ηm(1− ηs)
(1− ηm)ηs ·
(
Vsh
Vmh
)σ−ω
1−σ
.
So it follows that the log-slope of the RHS in (41) is
−
{
(1− )(1− α)[α+ ω(1− α)] ·
[
pisz
ΠKs
− pimz
ΠKm
]
+ (zˆ/z¯)[α+ (1− α)][α+ ω(1− α)− Λ] ·
[
pisz
ΠLs
− pimz
ΠLm
]}
× Γ(X)
α+ ω(1− α) + zˆf(zˆ|0)/F (zˆ|0) + ∫ [z˜(h)2 · f(z˜(h)|h)] g(h)dh.
The log-slope of the LHS in (41) is 1/ [1− qh(0)], which increases from 1 to∞ as qh(0)
increases from 0 to 1, and is larger than Γ(X) for all X > 0. Hence it suffices to show
that the absolute value of all terms multiplying Γ(X) are less than 1, which is true in
particular due to Assumption 5.2.
Intuitively, what the planner cares about is the marginal products of Z and H in
total. So when the distribution of z has a fat tail, the response of zˆ to the choice of
qh(0) is minimal as it changes Z smoothly along its entire support.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1. By Lemma 5, we know that no crossing can occur on (0, j) or (j, J), since
hˆ and hˆ1 already coincide at the boundaries 0 and J . Similarly, we also know from
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Theorem 1 that it can never be the case that there is no crossing (hˆ1(j) > hˆ(j) or
hˆ1(j) < hˆ(j) for all j ∈ J \ {0, J}). Hence, there must be a single crossing in J 1 since
Lemma 5 also rules out multiple crossings.
At this point, the only possibility for j∗ not to exist is if instead, there exists a
single crossing j∗∗ such that (i) hˆ1(j) < hˆ(j) for all j ∈ (0, j∗∗) and (ii) hˆ1(j) > hˆ(j)
for all j ∈ (j∗∗, J). If so, since [hˆ, hˆ1] are Lipschitz continuous and strictly monotone
in j, it must be the case that hˆ1′(0) < hˆ′(0), hˆ1′(j∗∗) > hˆ′(j∗∗) and hˆ1′(J) < hˆ′(J).
This implies
hˆ1′(j∗∗)
/
hˆ1′(0) ≥ hˆ′(j∗∗)/hˆ′(0), hˆ1′(J)/hˆ1′(j∗∗) ≤ hˆ′(J)/hˆ′(j∗∗). (46)
Let us focus on the first inequality. Using (32) and (35a) we obtain
0 > [α+ σ(1− α)] ·
[∫ j∗∗
0
∂ log b(hˆ1(j), j)
∂j
dj −
∫ j∗∗
0
∂ log b(hˆ(j), j)
∂j
dj
]
(47)
≥(1− σ)m+ log
[
F (zˆ1(j∗∗)|hˆ(j∗∗))/F (zˆ(j∗∗)|hˆ(j∗∗))
]
− log
[
F (zˆ1(0)|hˆ(0))/F (zˆ(0)|hˆ(0))
]
.
where the first inequality follows from (37), and applying (i). Since m > 0, if σ ∈ (0, 1),
Assumption 4 implies that the strict inequality in (47) holds only if∫ h∗∗
0
∂ log b(h′, jˆ1(h′))
∂h′
dh′ <
∫ h∗∗
0
∂ log b(h′, jˆ(h′))
∂h′
dh′
where we have written h∗∗ ≡ hˆ(j∗∗). And since jˆ(h) is the inverse of hˆ(j), (i) implies
that jˆ1(h) > jˆ(h) for all h ∈ (0, h∗∗). But this violates (38), the log-supermodularity
of b. The case for the second inequality in (46) is symmetric.
Part 2. Let ∆x denote the log-derivative of x w.r.t. m˜. Applying (33) into the
definition of Πih in (9), we obtain
∆Πih ·Πih = (σ − 1)
∫ j
j
piih(j)dj +
∫ {
piih(j) · (1− α)(σ − 1) ·∆Bj(j)
}
dj
≈ (σ − 1)
∫ j
j
piih(j)dj (48)
where the approximation follows from Assumption 6 and (42). Hence ∆Πih < 0 if
σ < 1. Rearranging (35b) and using (35a) at j = 0 we obtain
0 >
σ − ω
1− σ ·∆Πih −∆hˆ′(0) =
[
α+ ω(1− α) + zˆf(zˆ|0)/F (zˆ|0)]∆zˆ −∆Z (49)
where the inequality holds if ω < σ < 1, and since we know from part 1 that ∆hˆ′(0) ≥ 0.
Now suppose ∆zˆ ≥ 0. Then for (49) to hold it must be the case that ∆Z > 0, but from
(45), ∆Z ≤ 0 if ∆zˆ ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence, zˆ1 < zˆ, and z˜1(h) < z˜(h) for all h by
(44).
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B.5 Proof of Lemmas 2 and 3
From (26), the ∆Vi(j)’s are sector-neutral and common across sectors, except for ∆Vi(z).
Under Assumption 6, (42)-(43) imply
∆Vi(j) = σ − 1 < 0 ∀j ∈ J 1 and 0 otherwise. (50a)
So for workers, any difference in how the share of task j employment evolves differen-
tially across sectors depends only on ∆VLi , the sum of within-sector employment shifts,
weighted by the employment shares of all tasks within a sector Vi(j)/VLi = Li(j)/Li.
Since we know that intermediate jobs are the ones that are declining, from the defini-
tion of ΠLi in (20) a measure of the speed of polarization among workers is the total
change in their employment:
∆VilVil =
∫
J
Vi(j) ·∆Vi(j)dj = (σ − 1) ·
∫ j
j
Vi(j)dj
and we have used (50a). So we can compare the speeds of polarization across the two
sectors from
∆Vml −∆Vsl = (σ − 1) ·
∫ j
j
{[
νm(j)
Vml
− νs(j)
Vsl
]
· [M(j)Bj(j)1−α]σ−1/Bh(hˆ(j))} dj.
(50b)
Manager employment has sector-differential effects through Vih: Under Assumption 6
and using (48), we obtain
∆Vm(z) −∆Vs(z) = (σ − ω) ·
∫ j
j
{[
νm(j)
Vmh
− νs(j)
Vsh
]
· [M(j)Bj(j)1−α]σ−1} dj.
(50c)
Equations (50b) and (50c) imply that a sufficient condition for both horizontal and
vertical polarization to be faster in manufacturing, as in the data, is ω < σ < 1 and
νmh(j) νsh(j) for all j ∈ J 1, which is Lemma 2.
Structural change From (22) and (41) we obtain
∆Ls = Lm ·
{
∆VLs −∆VLm + ∆Q
}
. (51a)
The term ∆Ls − ∆Lm is the first-order force of structural change that comes only
from the change in selection rules. However, since this takes us off the between-
sector equilibrium, qh(0) must shift to satisfy the equilibrium condition (41). The net
amount of structural change will depend on whether the selection effect is overturned
or reinforced by the change in qh(0).
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Since Q(qh(0)) in (41) changes monotonically from 0 to ∞ in qh(0), we only need
to consider the direction of the change of the RHS off equilibrium. Using (50), the
log-derivative of the RHS of (41) can be written as
(1− )
{
σ − ω
(1− σ)(1− ω) · (∆Vsh −∆Vmh) +
(
α+
ω
1− ω
)(
∆ΠKs −∆ΠKm
)}
− [α+ (1− α)] (∆VLs −∆VLm) . (51b)
Under Lemma 2, the part with ∆Vih ’s is positive from (50b). The part with ∆ΠKi is
determined by
∆ΠKiΠKi = Πih∆Vih + piiz∆piiz , (51c)
∆pisz −∆pimz =
σ − ω
1− σ (∆Vsh −∆Vmh) . (51d)
Clearly, capital polarizes along with labor, both horizontally and vertically; and the
speed is faster in manufacturing if the assumptions in Lemma 3 holds.
Why structural change cannot be overturned, as explained in the text, is also
formalized here: Even if there is a decline in qh(0) due to the negative effect coming from
last term in (51b) dominating the positive effect from the first two terms, it can never
overturn the direction of structural change in (51a) as long as  < 1. Equations (50)-
(51) also make it clear that structural change depends differently on the productivities
of capital and labor.
C Quantitative Model and Numerical Details
With discrete tasks, it must be that the marginal product of the threshold worker is
equalized between tasks:
MPTi0 · (1− α)Ti0
Li0
= MPTi1 · (1− α)Ti1
h¯1Li1
· hˆ1,
MPTij · (1− α)Tij
(h¯j − χj)Lij
· (hˆj+1 − χj) = MPTij+1 · (1− α)Ti,j+1
(h¯j+1 − χj+1)Li,j+1
· (hˆj+1 − χj+1)
using Assumption 3, and Lij is the measure of workers in sector i, task j and h¯j ≡
Hij/Lij . Thus, we are assuming that the means of skills in task j are equal across
sectors i ∈ {m, s}, which is true when tasks are a continuum. Then
hˆ1 =
h¯1Li1
pii1Li0
,
hˆj+1 − χj+1
hˆj+1 − χj
=
piij(h¯j+1 − χj+1)Li2
pii,j+1(h¯j − χj)Li1
, (52)
where piij is the discrete version of (8), and can be expressed using (52) as
pii1 =
νi1
νi0
·
(
M1
M0
· hˆ1−α1
)σ−1
,
pii,j+1
piij
=
νi2
νi1
·
Mj+1
Mj
(
hˆj+1 − χj+1
hˆj+1 − χj
)1−ασ−1 .
(53)
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In equilibrium, indifference across tasks for threshold workers imply
w0 = wz zˆ = w1hˆ1, wj(hˆj+1 − χj) = wj+1(hˆj+1 − χj+1)
⇒ wz/w0 = 1/zˆ, w1/w0 = 1/hˆ1, wj+1/wj = hˆj+1 − χj+1
hˆj+1 − χj
. (54)
which is used to calibrate the distribution of skills in Section 5.3. The rest of the
parameters are calibrated as follows:
1. Guess (σ, ω).
2. Given elasticities, first fit 1980 moments:
(a) Guess (M,Am).
(b) Plug in the threshold values x1980 implied by the skill distribution, along
with the empirical values of (Liz, Li0, . . . , Li9), the employment shares of
each occupation in sector i ∈ {m, s} from Table 5, into (12) and (52). Then
we recover all the νij ’s from (52)-(53), and the ηi’s from (12) and (34) in
closed form (since Mj = M are assumed to be equal for all j). This ensures
that the 1980 equilibrium exactly fits within-sector employment shares by
occupation (20 parameters, 20 moments).
(c) Repeat from (a) until we exactly fit the manufacturing employment share in
1980, and output per worker of 1.45 Since (19) and (21) are monotone in
(M,Am), the solution is unique (2 parameters, 2 moments).
3. Given elasticities and all parameters, calibrate growth rates to 2010 moments:
(a) Guess m0.
(b) Guess {mj}9j=z,1. Plug in threshold values x2010 and new TFP’s into (12)
and (52), which yields equilibrium employment shares by occupation, within
each sector. Then use (19)-(21) to solve for the 2010 equilibrium, which
yields equilibrium employment shares between sectors.
(c) Repeat from (a) until we exactly exactly fit aggregate GDP (or equivalently
TFP) in 2010. (1 parameter, 1 moment).
4. Repeat from 1. to minimize the distance between the within-sector employment
shares by occupation (but not necessarily by sector) implied by the 2010 model
equilibrium and the data (13 parameters, 21 moments).
45The latter must be matched since the value of K1980 we plug in from the data was normalized by 1980’s
output.
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For (σ, ω), we first search globally by setting a 100×100 grid that covers the box
[0, 2] × [0, 2], then locally search from the best point using a Nelder-Meade simplex
algorithm.
D Tables and Figures Not in Text
Ranked by mean wage COC Employment Shares (%) Rel. Wages
(except management) Group 1980 2010 Manufacturing 1980 2010
Low Skill Services 400 10.44 13.92 0.59 0.23 0.65 0.55
Middle Skill 59.09 46.48 25.86 12.93 0.90 0.77
Administrative Support 300 16.57 14.13 3.47 1.53 0.78 0.68
Machine Operators 700 9.81 3.75 8.79 3.02 0.84 0.64
Transportation 800 8.73 6.64 3.80 2.28 0.89 0.63
Sales 240 7.87 9.37 0.79 0.62 0.94 0.90
Technicians 200 3.23 3.86 1.00 0.57 1.04 1.12
Mechanics & Construction 500 7.91 6.02 4.44 3.19 1.06 0.81
Miners & Precision Workers 600 4.97 2.71 3.58 1.73 1.09 0.77
High Skill 19.22 26.16 3.87 3.64 1.26 1.30
Professionals 40 11.02 16.51 1.73 1.45 1.21 1.26
Management Support 20 8.20 9.65 2.14 2.20 1.32 1.37
Management 1 11.26 13.44 2.47 2.59 0.00 0.00
Table 5: Occupation×Sector Employment and Relative Wages
Source: US Census (5%), 1980 and 2010. All employment shares are in percent of aggregate employment.
The first two columns show the employment share of each occupation for each year. The “Manufacturing”
columns show manufacturing employment of each occupation for each year (so the sum across all occupations
is the manufacturing employment share). Relative wages are normalized so that the mean wage across all
occupations is 1.
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Ranked by mean wage (1) (2) BM Data
(except management) m (%) mj (%) mj (%)
Low Skill Services 1.973 -2.726 -0.731
Middle Skill
Administrative Support 1.973 1.252 2.930
Machine Operators 1.973 10.018 9.122
Transportation 1.973 3.326 4.348
Sales 1.973 -1.895 0.012
Technicians 1.973 -2.484 -1.144
Mechanics & Construction 1.973 1.742 2.315
Miners & Precision Workers 1.973 6.367 6.328
High Skill
Professionals 1.973 -3.973 -2.248
Management Support 1.973 -1.973 -0.489
Management 1.973 -1.438 -0.017
Aggregate TFP growth (%) 1.030 1.030 1.030 1.030
am (Manu TFP growth, %) 0.252 0.252 2.943 2.229
as (Serv TFP growth, %) -1.205 2.021 0.308 0.743
Table 6: Recalibrated TFP Growth Rates for Counterfactuals
Column (1) stands for the counterfactual in which we set mj = m and calibrate (am, as) to match sectoral
TFP’s, and (2) for when we let ({mj}9j=z,0, am, as) all vary simultaneously. “BM” stands for the benchmark
calibration. For all scenarios, aggregate GDP growth (and consequently TFP growth) is matched exactly,
shown in the first row of the bottom panel. For the “BM” and “Data” columns, the am and as rows show
the empirical growth rates of the manufacturing and services sectors’ TFP’s, respectively.
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∆Lj
TFP - 9.584 ∗∗∗
R2 0.939
RTI (DOT) 0.429
(0.268)
Routine manual 0.797∗∗ 0.618
(0.206) (0.527)
Manual interpersonal -0.767∗∗ -0.192
(0.192) (0.549)
College share 1980 -11.142∗ -7.994∗∗
(3.599) (2.269)
∆College share 1980-2010 -33.673∗ -20.295∗
(17.410) (13.547)
Constant 1.061 0.377 3.281∗∗ 1.065 4.035∗ 4.818∗ 5.204∗
(0.941) (0.738) (0.970) (2.339) (1.401) (1.674) (1.759)
R2 0.184 0.635 0.588 0.640 0.439 0.372 0.539
Standard errors in parentheses, †p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01
Table 7: Task-Specific TFP Growth, Employment, and Empirical Measures
The first panel shows the results from regressing employment share changes on the calibrated task-specific
TFP growth rates, mj . The second panel shows the results from regressing the TFP growth rates on various
occupation-level empirical measures.
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Fig. 21: Manufacturing Employment Shares and Routine Job Shares
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Left: Manufacturing employment share by occupation-skill percentile in 1980.
Right: Share of top employment-weighted third of occupations in terms of RTI by skill percentile, replicates
Autor and Dorn (2013) who construct RTI from detailed task requirements by occupation in DOT. Occupa-
tions are ranked by their 1980 mean wage for 11 one-digit groups and smoothed across 322 three-digit groups,
separately. The x-axis units are in percent share of employment. Further details in text and Appendix A.
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(b) Manager Wage by Sector
Fig. 22: Relative Manager Wages
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Left: levels and ratio of mean wages or managers and all other workers in
aggregate. Right: relative mean wage of managers over all other workers within manufacturing and services.
“Manufacturing” combines manufacturing, mining and construction, and services subsumes service and
government. See Appendix A for how we define management in the census and Figure 20 for a detailed
breakdown of the manager group.
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(b) Manufacturing-Services Average Wage Ratio
Fig. 23: Manufacturing vs. Services by Occuaption
Source: U.S. Census (5%). Left: manufacturing employment share within the manager occupation group
and all other workers. Right: mean wage of manufacturing employment relative to services employment
within the manager occupation group and all other workers. “Manufacturing” combines manufacturing,
mining and construction, and services subsumes service and government. See Appendix A for how we define
management in the census and Figure 20 for a detailed breakdown of the manager group.
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(b) Log GDP per Worker Growth
Fig. 24: Aggregate Output and TFP Growth
Data: NIPA. Log 1980 levels are normalized to 0, so the slopes of the lines are the growth rates.
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(a) Log GDP per Worker, Manufacturing
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(b) Log GDP per Worker, Services
Fig. 25: Benchmark vs. Counterfactuals, GDP per Worker
Data: NIPA. “Manufacturing” combines manufacturing, mining and construction, and services subsumes
service and government. Log 1980 levels are normalized to 0, so the slopes of the lines are the growth rates.
63
1980 1990 2000 2010
0.58
0.6
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
 
 
Data
Benchmark
Only Sectoral
Both
(a) Services Employment Share, Routine Jobs
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(b) Services Employment Share, Managers
Fig. 26: Benchmark vs. Counterfactuals, Structural Change
Vertical axes are the fractions of routine jobs (left) and mangers (right) in services.
64
References
Acemoglu, D. (2002, March). Technical change, inequality and the labor market.
Journal of Economic Literature 40 (1), 7–72.
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor (2011). Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for
employment and earnings. In D. Card and O. Ashenfelter (Eds.), Handbook of Labor
Economics, Volume 4, Part B, pp. 1043 – 1171. Elsevier.
Acemoglu, D. and V. Guerrieri (2008, 06). Capital Deepening and Nonbalanced Eco-
nomic Growth. Journal of Political Economy 116 (3), 467–498.
Arnold, B. C. (2014). Univariate and multivariate pareto models. Journal of Statistical
Distributions and Applications 1 (1), 1–16.
Autor, D. H. and D. Dorn (2013). The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polar-
ization of the us labor market. American Economic Review 103 (5), 1553–97.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and M. S. Kearney (2006). The polarization of the u.s. labor
market. American Economic Review 96 (2), 189–194.
Autor, D. H., F. Levy, and R. J. Murnane (2003). The Skill Content of Recent
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118 (4), 1279–1333.
Ba´ra´ny, Z. L. and C. Siegel (2017). Job polarization and structural change. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
Buera, F. J. and J. P. Kaboski (2012, October). The Rise of the Service Economy.
American Economic Review 102 (6), 2540–69.
Buera, F. J., J. P. Kaboski, and R. Rogerson (2015, May). Skill Biased Structural
Change. NBER Working Papers 21165, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Burstein, A., E. Morales, and J. Vogel (2015, January). Accounting for Changes
in Between-Group Inequality. NBER Working Papers 20855, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Caliendo, L., F. Monte, and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2015). The Anatomy of French Pro-
duction Hierarchies. Journal of Political Economy 123 (4), 809 – 852.
Costinot, A. and J. Vogel (2010, 08). Matching and Inequality in the World Economy.
Journal of Political Economy 118 (4), 747–786.
Dorn, D. (2009). Essays on Inequality, Spatial Interaction, and the Demand for Skills.
Ph. D. thesis, University of St. Gallen.
Du¨rnecker, G. and B. Herrendorf (2017). Structural transformation of occupation
employment. Technical report.
65
Firpo, S., N. M. Fortin, and T. Lemieux (2011, February). Occupational tasks and
changes in the wage structure. IZA Discussion Papers 5542, Institute for the Study
of Labor.
Gabaix, X. and A. Landier (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 49–100.
Garicano, L. and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2006, November). Organization and inequality
in a knowledge economy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4), 1383–1435.
Goos, M., A. Manning, and A. Salomons (2014). Explaining job polarization: Routine-
biased technological change and offshoring. American Economic Review 104 (8),
2509–26.
Herrendorf, B., C. Herrington, and A. Valentinyi (2015). Sectoral technology and
structural transformation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7.
Herrendorf, B., R. Rogerson, and A. Valentinyi (2013). Two perspectives on preferences
and structural transformation. American Economic Review 103 (7), 2752–89.
Herrendorf, B., R. Rogerson, and A. Valentinyi (2014). Growth and Structural Trans-
formation. In Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 2 of Handbook of Economic
Growth, Chapter 6, pp. 855–941. Elsevier.
Katz, L. F. and K. M. Murphy (1992, February). Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987:
Supply and demand factors. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 35–78.
Krusell, P., L. E. Ohanian, J.-V. R´ıos-Rull, and G. L. Violante (2000, September).
Capital-skill complementarity and inequality: a macroeconomic analysis. Econo-
metrica 68 (5), 1029–1054.
Lee, E. (2015). Trade, inequality, and the endogenous sorting of heterogeneous workers.
Lee, S. Y. T., Y. Shin, and D. Lee (2015, November). The option value of human capital:
Higher education and wage inequality. NBER Working Papers 21724, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Lucas, R. E. (1978, Autumn). On the size distribution of business firms. Bell Journal
of Economics 9 (2), 508–523.
Meyer, P. B. and A. M. Osborne (2005, September). Proposed Category System
for 1960-2000 Census Occupations. Working Papers 383, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Ngai, L. R. and C. A. Pissarides (2007, March). Structural Change in a Multisector
Model of Growth. American Economic Review 97 (1), 429–443.
Stokey, N. L. (2016, April). Technology, skill and the wage structure. NBER Working
Papers 22176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Tervio, M. (2008, June). The difference that CEOs make: An assignment model
approach. American Economic Review 98 (3), 642–68.
66
